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ABSTRACT
This study attempts to determine the extent that Dakota 
territorial and North Dakota State governors have exercised the 
gubernatorial veto. The approach is historical. The development 
of the gubernatorial veto is outlined, the state constitutional 
provisions concerning it are presented, and individual performances 
by governors are indicated. A more detailed account of the veto 
exercised by the current Governor, William L. Guy, is given.
Dakota Territory was created with the governor having an 
absolute veto over acts of the legislature. Later Congress granted 
the legislature the power to override a veto. Ten territorial 
governors used the veto and a number of vetoes were overridden by 
the legislatures. The item veto was denied to territorial governors.
When North Dakota became a State the governor was granted 
the full veto and an item veto over appropriation bills, subject to 
legislative overriding by a two-thirds roll call vote. Neither 
veto applied to initiated or referred measures. Later the governor 
was granted veto power:'over the State Industrial Commission.
Evidence indicates that 523 vetoes have been issued by North 
Dakota governors. Only nineteen have been overridden by legislative 
action. One veto was sustained by court action. The veto has not 
been abused by any governor. A large number of vetoes have been in 
the public interest.
It is recommended that governors be granted more time to
vii
study legislation, reduce items in appropriation bills, and be 
elected with the lieutenant governor as a team. Annual sessions 
of the legislature are also advocated.
INTRODUCTION
One of the most x^idely discussed weapons in the legislative 
arsenal of North Dakota governors has been the executive veto. This 
weapon has been available to the governors of the Dakota Territory as 
well as the State of North Dakota.
This study is an attempt to determine to what extent the 
Dakota territorial and North Dakota State governors have exercised the 
gubernatorial veto. The approach is historical, that is, it traces 
the development of the veto power of Dakota Territory and North Dakota 
State governors.
Research in North Dakota politics is a great experience 
especially on the gubernatorial veto. Because there has been so little 
done on the governor's veto power, the researcher has an advantage of 
plowing a virgin terrain of inquiry. On the other hand, there are 
handicaps to obtaining accurate information. A number of original 
documents pertaining to the veto were destroyed in the North Dakota 
Capitol building fire. The early Legislative Assembly law books do 
not record the number of vetoes or the reasons for the vetoes. The 
early session journals of the House and Senate are not consistent in 
the information on the veto. The newspaper sources also contain a 
number of discrepencies and omissions. What is recorded in this 
paper is information taken from available sources, determined to be 
the most accurate by this researcher.
1
CHAPTER I
THE GUBERNATORIAL VETO IN THE DAKOTA TERRITORY
The term "veto" has been traced to ancient Rome, where the 
tribune of the plebs had the power to annul or suspend the acts of 
other public authorities. The term "veto" (I forbid) was used by the 
tribune to cancel any command of a consul which infringed upon the 
liberties of a citizen. This power was gradually extended to other 
administrative acts and even to decrees of the Roman Senate.
The veto power of American governors is derived from the 
legislative power of the British Crown. In Britain the king's 
approval was necessary for a bill to be enacted and without this 
approval a bill was not a law.^
When the English Colonies were established in America, the 
approval or disapproval of legislation by the governor or proprietor 
was found, to some degree, in two of the three types of colonies. In 
the charter colonies, the elected governors did not have the power to 
disapprove acts of the legislatures. In the proprietary colonies, the 
proprietor exercised the power of disapproval; and in his absence this 
power was delegated to his deputy. In the royal colonies, which were 
the most numerous, the appointed governors had an absolute veto over 
the acts of the legislature. Even if the governor of the colony
-̂John A. Fairlie, "The Veto Power of the State Governor," 
American Political Science Review, XI (August, 1917), p. 473•
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approved the acts of the assembly, the king might later disallow 
them because of his final veto over acts of the colonial legislature. 
Some acts of the assemblies required the approval of the king in 
council.^
Both the colonial governors and the British government used the 
power of disapproving colonial laws. This led to a great deal of 
discontent among the colonial people. In New York, of the bills 
passea in the colonial period, eight were disapproved by the governor 
and sixteen were disallowed by the Crown. The disallowance of laws 
by the king in council was mentioned first of the grievancies listed 
in the Declaration of Independence.
This distrust and opposition to the governor and to the royal 
veto appeared in the early state constitutions. These state constitu­
tions restricted the powers of the governor and invested in the 
legislature almost absolute power. Only three of the thirteen original 
states made any provision in their state constitutions for a veto of 
acts of the legislature. South Carolina was the first to give the 
governor veto power with its temporary constitution of 1776. It gave 
the governor an absolute veto over acts of the legislature, but two 
years later it revised its constitution and omitted the veto power 
entirely. The other two' states. New York and Massachusetts, each 
provided for a modified and qualified negative on legislation.
Under the New York Constitution of 1??7, a provision for a 
council of revision, made up of the governor, the chancellor and the 
judge of the supreme court, was created. All bills passed by the
^Ibid., p. 474. See S. B. Greene: The Provincial Governor, 
pp. 6, 13, 14, 162-165, for detail on colonial government veto powrer.
legislature were sent to this council. The council had ten days in 
which they could return any bill with their objections in writing to 
the legislature. But if each house passed by a two-thirds vote of all 
the members of each house a returned bill, such a bill became law.
Bills not returned within ten days or the adjournment of the legis­
lature prevented return, became law at the beginning of the next 
session.-^ Thomas Jefferson, in his plan of government for Virginia 
in 1783. proposed a council of revision similar to New York.*4-
In the Massachusetts State Constitution of 1780, the veto power . 
of the governor was in limited form. All bills and resolves were 
submitted to the governor for his approval or disapproval. The bills 
and resolves disapproved by the governor were to be returned to the 
legislature within five days along with the governor’s objections.
This legislation could be reconsidered and repassed by a two-thirds 
vote of the members of each house of the legislature.-^
The growing distrust of unchecked legislative supremacy was 
first reflected in the Federal Convention of 1787.^ The people who 
controlled the convention preferred the executive veto as established 
in Massachusetts to the mixed form of New York. The action of the 
Federal Convention greatly influenced the subsequent action of the 
states.'’ The President of the United States was vested with a
3Ibid., p . 475•
^Arthur N. Holcombe, State Government of the United States 





qualified negative on legislation similar, in the main, to the power 
of the governor of Massachusetts. This was undoubtedly a factor in 
the gradual extension of the veto power of the state governors.®
It was a very slow extension. Between 1793 and 1812, no state
oconferred the power of veto on the governor.7 This condition was 
brought about by the rising tide of democracy in the states.^
Another factor contributing to the slow development was the rise of 
the Jeffersonian Republicans in opposition to the centralized policy 
of the Federalists.^
Since 1812 the distrust of the governors veto has diminished 
so that every new state admitted to the Union, except Vest Virginia, 
has provided for some type of gubernatorial veto power over legis- 
lative bills. ^ The general adoption of the veto in the new states 
may be due in part to the fact that Congress gave the territorial 
governors this power over measures of the territorial legislatures.13
Since the Civil War the governors veto has been extended to 
all but one state of the Union. North Carolina is the only state 
which fails to give the governor the veto power.^





-'-̂ Frank W. Prescott, "The Executive Veto In American States," 
Western Political Quarterly. Ill (March, 1950), p. 98.
^Fairlie, p. 4-77*
•̂ Book of the States 19&J— 65. Vol. XV (Chicago: The Council of 
State Government, 196k), pp. 58-59*
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by the Ordinance of 1787 which, in fact, gave them an absolute 
negative over the laws passed by the territorial legislatures.
Section 11 of the Ordinance of 1787 states:
The general assembly, or legislature, shall consist of 
the governor, legislative council, and a house of representa­
tives.
The governor, legislative council and house of representa­
tives shall have authority to make laws in all cases for the 
good government of the district, not repugnant to the principles 
and articles in this ordinance established and declared. And 
all bills, having passed by a majority in the house, and by a 
majority in the council, shall be referred to the governor for 
his assent; but no bill, or legislative act whatever, shall be 
of any force without his assent. The governor shall have 
power to convene, prorogue, and dissolve the general assembly 
when, in his opinion, it shall be expedient.15
There were some people who wanted part of the governor's 
power changed to allow him the veto, but not the power to dissolve 
the legislature.-^ By the time that the territory of Dakota was 
created by Congress on March 2, 1861,^ the veto power of territorial 
governors was still absolute, but the governors no longer had the 
power to dissolve the territorial legislative assemblies. The 
governor could veto acts of the legislature, but the legislature 
could not override the governor's veto. When the legislature 
adjourned, bills vetoed by the governor could not become law. All 
bills not signed by the governor at adjournment could also not
^William MacDonald, Select Documents Illustrative of the 
History of the United States 1776-1861 (New York: Macmillan Co.,
1897) . p. "25.
-^Debates of Congress 1789-1856 (New York: D. Aopelton and Co., 
1857), pp. 9-2-46.
David W. Parker, Calendar of Papers in Washington Archives 
Relating to the Territories of the United States (to 1873) (Washington: 
Published by the Carnegie Institution of ’Washington, 1911), pp. 54-55*
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become law. That is to say, the territorial governors had an
1 ftabsolute veto as well as a pocket veto.
When President Lincoln signed Senate Bill 562, "An Act to 
Provide a Temporary Government for the Territory of Dakota and to 
Create the Office of Surveyor - General Therein," the veto power 
of the Dakota Territory governor was established in Section 2 of 
the a c t . T h e  act reads:
That the executive power and authority in and over said 
Territory of Dakota, shall be vested in a governor, who shall 
hold his office for four years, and until his successor shall 
be appointed and qualified, unless sooner removed by the presi­
dent of the United States. The governor shall reside within 
said territory, shall be commander-in-chief of the militia 
thereof, shall perform the duties and receive the emoluments 
of superintendent of Indian affairs, and shall approve all 
laws passed by the legislative assembly before they shall take 
effect; he may grant pardons for offences against the law of 
said territory, and reprieves for offences against the laws 
of the United States until the decision of the president can 
be made known thereon; he shall commission all officers who 
shall be appointed to office under the laws of said territory, 
and shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.20
During the second session of the 36th Congress, i860, 
Representative Galuzha Groxj of Pennsylvania, a member of the House 
Committee on Territories, recommended a change in the law organizing 
territories. His recommendation would have allowed the territorial 
legislatures to overrule the governor's veto by a majority of the 
legislature.2-*- But his suggestion was not enacted into law at this
-*®Prescott, The Executive Veto in American States, p. 105» 
^ Congressional Globe, 2nd Session, 36th Congress, Part 2,
1860-61, p. 1362.
^Territory of Dakota, Session Laws, 1862, p. 22. 
^ Congressional Globe, 2nd Session, 36th Congress, Part 1,
1860-61, p. 81.
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time and the Territory of Dakota x*as admitted with the governor of 
the territory having an absolute veto.
From the first session of the Dakota Territorial Legislature 
through the eighteenth session, the governors of the territory used 
the message veto as well as the pocket veto. Colonel Clement A. 
Lounsberry reported in his North Dakota History and People:
This first session of the Legislative Assembly was rather 
exciting, and at sometime the relations between the legislative 
and the executive departments were considerably strained over 
the governor's determination to prevent the issue of any bonded 
indebtedness by counties or municipal corporations, unless the 
same had been approved by a vote of the people, the governor 
deeming this precaution necessary to keep down an incipient 
spirit of wildness, tending to repudiation. The records of 
the territory show that the governor withheld his signature 
to nearly or quite one-third of the acts passed by the Legis­
lative Assembly.22
The first territorial governor of Dakota was William Jayne
from Illinois, who not only exercised the veto power but some other
power as well. Edna LaKoore Waldo relates that:
William Jayne, played a lone hand, •wielding the big stick with 
his veto power and where that did not suffice, resorting to 
fisticuffs on downtown streets as did the best of his
colleagues.23
Jayne, who was the founder of the Dakota Republican Party, at the 
time of the Second Legislature had absolute power under the Organic 
Act to veto any bill, .and there was no appeal.25
^clement A. Lounsberry, North Dakota History and People 
Outlines of American History (Chicago: The S. J. Clarke Publishing Co., 
1917), p. 372.
23Edna LaMoore Waldo, Dakota An Informal Study of Territorial 
Days Gleaned From Contemp0rary~ Ke'wsr,aners~TBismarck: Capitol Publishing 
Co., 1932), p. 2̂ 7.
2%loward Roberts Lamar, Dakota Territory, 1861-1869; A Study of 
Frontier Politics (New Haven: Yale University press, 1956)7P» 69.
25oeorge W. Kingsbury, Dakota Territory, Vol. I (Chicago: The 
S. J. Clarke Publishing Co., 1915), P* 26>2.
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Governor Jayne ran into political opposition, over his use of 
the veto, at the People's Union Territorial Convention in 1862. A 
part of the party platform contained a plank on the use of the veto:
That the present unlimited veto power of the governor 
strips the Legislature of its free expression of the will of 
the people, and we therefore favor amending the Organic Act 
by Congress, so as to confer upon the governor only the usual 
two-thirds veto power; and to give to the people, through 
their Legislature, control of the public printing.2°
On-January 3* 1863, the second session of the Legislative 
Assembly of the Dakota Territory approved a message to the United 
States Congress asking for a change in the act granting a temporary 
government for the Territory of Dakota. The Legislative Assembly 
desired Congress to change the unlimited veto power of the governor 
by allowing the legislature the power to pass laws by the usual two-
thirds majority.
Relief from the absolute veto of the Dakota Territorial 
governor came on March 2, I863. The Congress approved an amendment to 
the Organic Act by amending Section Two to read:
That every bill which shall have passed the Legislative 
Assembly shall, before it become a law, be presented to the 
Governor of the Territory; if he approve, he shall sign it; 
but if not, he shall return it, with his objections, to the 
house in which it originated, who.shall enter the objections 
at large on their journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, 
after such reconsideration, two-thirds of that house shall 
agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the 
objections to the other house, by which it shall likewise be 
reconsidered; and if approved by two-thirds of that house, 
it shall become a law. But in all such cases the votes of 
both houses shall be determined by,yeas and nays, to be 
entered on the journal of each house respectively. If any 
bill shall not be returned by the Governor within three days
^ Ibid., p. 223.
^Territory of Dakota, Session Laws, I863, p. 272.
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(Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, 
the same shall be a law in like manner as if he has signed it, 
unless the Assembly, by adjournment, prevent its return, in 
which case it shall not be a law.23
Under the amended law the governor still retained the message veto as
well as the pocket veto, but the legislature could now override the
governor's veto during the legislative session.
The law passed by Congress that allowed the territorial
legislature of Dakota Territory to override the governor's veto was
included in the bill to provide a temporary government for the
Territory of Colorado.2^ This law corresponded to the law of the
30Territory of Kansas.
On June 20, 1874, the United States Congress revised the veto 
power of the governor of the territory by clarifying when the legis­
lature adjourned and changed some of the wording in the section dealing 
with the veto power. The principal changes, found in Section 1842 of 
the revised statutes of the United States of 1874, required the names 
of the members of the legislature voting for or against overriding of 
the governor's veto to be entered in the journals of each house. Also, 
the words "sine die" were added in the sentence pertaining to the 
legislature adjourning and preventing a bill from being returned by 
the governor to the legislature.-^"
The ten men who served as governors of the Dakota Territory all
2®Territory of Dakota, Session laws, 1867, pp. XLII-XLIII. 
^ C ongressional Globe Appendix, 37th Congress, 3^8 Session,
1863, p. 200.
30congressional Globe Appendix, 33r8 Congress, 1st Session, 
v 23, 1853-54, p. 2229.
3lTerritory of Dakota, Session Laws, I885, pp. IV-V.
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had the veto power and there are indications that all of them, with the 
possible exception of Governor Arthur Millette, exercised this power 
with various degrees of intensity. Likewise, after Congress had 
granted the territorial legislature the power to override the 
governor's veto, the legislature used this power which created some 
conflict between the executive and the legislative branches of govern­
ment.
A part of this conflict between the executives and the legis­
latures was due to the appointment of outsiders to the office of
governor. Of the first four governors appointed, only Governor Newton
32Edmunds was an old resident of the territory to be named. Of the
eleven men appointed to the governorship of the Dakota Territory, only
three were considered as residents of Dakota, and two of the three were
33the last two governors of the territorial government.
One other condition that contributed to the effectiveness of
the legislatures resistance to appointive officers was the legal limits
placed upon their numbers. The small number of members allowed in
each house of the legislature enabled the legislators to work together
harmoniously to override the governor's vetoes. The Bismarck Tribune
of February 25, 1881, complained:
The members of both houses seem to have combined against 
the executive, . . . but when Dakota becomes a state and the 
membership of the legislature is enlarged, vetoes will begin 
to be considered as they deserve.3^ 3
3 ̂ Waldo, p. 256.
Earl S. Pomeroy, The Territories and the United States 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 19^7), pp. 127-128.
3i)lbid., p. 101.
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Not one of the first fifteen Legislative Assemblies had a total 
membership in both houses larger than thirty-nine members. The 
largest number of members the Council had, until the sixteenth session 
of 1885. was thirteen, and the greatest number of members in the House 
of Representatives, for the same period of time, was twenty-six.3-5 
However, even increasing the Council to twenty-four and the House to 
forty-eight, as Congress provided in 188^, did not reduce the number 
of legislature overrides of governor's vetoes or the attempts to 
override.
At the time of the Bismarck Tribune's complaint, the fourteenth 
legislature of 1881 had overridden twelve of the governor's vetoes.3°
In I885 there was one veto overridden by the legislature.3? The 
following session in 1887 found the Assembly overriding two of the 
governor's vetoes.3® The eighteenth and final session of the legis­
lature in 1839 overrode twenty vetoes of Governor Lewis K. Church.39 
For the legislative sessions from 1881 through 1889, there were a 
total of 925 general, special and private laws that passed both houses
hjQof the legislature. The executive did not sign eighty-seven of 
these bills when presented to him, during the session, and these bills
-^Frank H. Hagerty, Territory of Dakota (Aberdeen: Daily News 
Print, 1819), pp. 13-22.
3^Territory of Dakota, Session Laws, 1881.
^Territory of Dakota, Session Laws, 1885, PP* 26-2?.
3®Territory of Dakota, Session Laws, 1887.
39Territory of Dakota, Session Laws, 1889•
^Hagerty, pp. 13-22.
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became law. For the same time period, the Legislative Assembly over-
41rode thirty-five of the executive vetoes.
The subject material of the governor's vetoes in the Dakota
Territorial period covers a number of topics. Governors Jayne and
Edmunds vetoed bills granting divorces to specific women in the
territory. Until 1866 the legislature granted individual divorces
by passing individual bills. Governor Edmunds vetoed all divorce
l\,obills sent to him. It was the Governor's belief that the granting 
of divorces should be the function of the territorial courts, not the 
legislature.^3 In 1866 Congress amended the Organic lav; of all the 
territories. This was done to prohibit the pernicious legislation 
which had characterized the enactments of some of the territorial 
legislatures.^ A part of this amended law prohibited the legislatures 
from granting divorces, leaving that authority to the courts of the 
territories.^ This action had been recommended by Governor Edmunds 
in his veto messages of the divorce bills.^
Governor John L. Pennington had an unusual experience over 
his use of the veto. Pennington vetoed a bond bill for grasshopper 
relief only to have the legislature override the veto. The legislature, 
after overriding the veto, made no attempt to set the law into
^Compiled from the Session Laws of the 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th 






operation. The Governor then appealed to the citizens for help to 
provide money for grasshopper relief. Pennington admitted that he 
had erred in his estimate of the misfortune. ?
Pennington was also placed in a situation that some later 
governors of the State of.North Dakota would be also placed in. This 
situation occurs when legislation is sent to the governor for approval 
or disapproval at the end of the session and he doesn't have the time 
to fully read all the bills placed before him. Pennington failed to 
veto a bill that he did not have time to read except by title and the 
title was misleading as to the contents of the bill. When it was 
discovered what the law would do, the Governor went to Washington and 
talked with the territorial delegate asking his help. Delegate Kidder 
was able to convince the Congress to rule out the objectionable part 
of the law.48
Governor Nehemiah G. Ordway lost a veto to the legislature’s 
two-thirds majority when he vetoed a bill for extra pay for the judge 
of the First Judicial District. The Governor had the weight of an 
opinion by the United States Attorney-General on his side, but the 
Attorney-General did not base his opinion on the illegality of the 
bill, only that it was not desirable. The fourteenth legislature 
of the Dakota Territory had many good lawyers and the bill was passed 
over Ordway*s veto, regardless of the United States Attorney-General’s 
opinion.4^ Ordway was also thought to be using his veto message to
4?Ibid., pp. 846-847.
48Ibid., pp. 836-840.
^Kingsbury, Vol. II, pp. 1172-1173.
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strengthen himself in Washington rather than secure the favor of the 
territorial legislature.-'’®
Governor Gilbert A. Pierce ran into opposition of a number of 
factions over his use of the veto. Pierce vetoed a bill giving women 
above the age of twenty-one the right to vote. The legislature failed 
to override his veto, partly because of his reasons for vetoing the 
bill. The Governor found enough defects in the framing of the bill 
to condemn it and he was of the opinion that the law would delay claim 
to statehood. Pierce also doubted that women wanted the franchise 
or that the sentiment of the territory favored it.-̂ " Pierce didn't 
escape the indignation of some women over his veto of this bill.
Pierce was denounced by Kate Stoneman of Albany. She sent a request 
to President Cleveland that Pierce be summarily removed from off ice.-52 
Cleveland didn't follow her request to remove Pierce, as Pierce 
continued in office until he resigned in 1837.
Pierce also vetoed a bill to change the name of the town of 
Ordway to Independence. One historian stated that the Governor had 
apparently come to the conclusion that it was the duty of governors 
to stand by one another.-53 a bill to move the capitol from Bismarck 
to Pierre was also vetoed by Pierce.
Governor Louis K. Church ran into political opposition from
5°Ibid., p. 1173.
5-*~Ibid., p. 1401. Text of veto message, see p. 1402.
52tfaldo, p. 292.
^Kingsbury, p. 1397-
-̂ Ibid., see veto message p. 1397*
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two political parties over his use of the veto. At the Republican 
Territorial Convention, to elect delegates to the Republican National 
Convention, held at Jamestown in May 1888, an address to the people 
of the United States was presented for approval. In this address the 
Governor's use of the veto was attacked:
He has wielded his executive club over the Legislature 
by threatening to veto certain bills, and promising to approve 
bills with jobs in them.55
Not only did the Republicans attack Democratic Governor Church 
but his own political party also attacked him. At the territorial 
Democratic Convention at Watertown in May 1889, there was a great deal 
of anti-Church feeling. This feeling went so far as to call for 
Church's impeachment.-^ A part of the statement calling for Church's 
impeachment, as presented by Mr. Brierly of Grand Forks County, is 
almost identical with the Republican statement. Mr. Brierly states 
in part:
He has wielded his executive club over the Legislature, 
threatening with his veto measures that did not conform to 
his ideas of propriety, and promising his approval on bills 
with jobs in them for his special friends as well as himself
Governor Church was not impeached nor did the threats or 
political warfare hinder his veto. The Bismarck Tribune of March 10, 
1889, criticizes the lavish use of the veto by Church to prevent 
forty-three more laws from taking effect.^® *5
5-5lbid., p. 1517.




Governor Church's attitude and his. method on the use of the 
veto was described by Senator Thomas J. Walsh in a letter. Walsh wrote:
Church is not a name to conjure with in this neighborhood 
or in any other. Nine members of the council besought him to 
sign the bill or return it with his reasons but he coolly dropped 
it into the waste basket and told them he had no time to write 
veto messages. He assumed a most dictatorial authority over 
legislation and never a Roman senate was more obsequious to 
emperor than that chosen from our remarkably independent 
people to their little Caesar.59
Governor Church may have contributed to securing a new weapon 
in the veto power of the future governors of the State of North Dakota 
when he commented on the desirability of allowing the governor to veto 
items in bills. Church, in his messages to the Secretary of the 
Interior, expressed the desirability of allowing the governor to 
veto items in bills, a power the territorial governors of Dakota did 
not have. In Church's message to the Secretary in 1887, he stated:
It would have been well had the same act clothed the 
governors with power to veto items in the appropriation bills 
and thereby prevent the loading down of needful and proper 
bills of appropriation with what is often not only unnecessary 
but extravagant.00
One year later, in his message to the Secretary of the Interior, he 
commented on the item veto:
The matter of providing for the maintenance of our various 
Territorial institutions and officers and general expenses of 
the Territorial government and the passage at times of excessive 
or unnecessary appropriations and the habit of tacking on 
proper appropriations unnecessary and expensive items, commonly
•59j. Leonard Bates (ed.), Tom Walsh in Dakota Territory, 
Personal Correspondence of Senator Thomas J. Walsh and Eleanor C. 
KcCl'em'ent (Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1966). p. 119.
^°Report of the Governor of Dakota to the Secretary of the 
Interior 1887 (Washington: Government Press), p. 47.
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called riders, suggests the propriety of the passage by Congress 
of such laws as would enable the governor to veto items of 
appropriations in bills, and approving such as are unobjection­
able.
Congress did not enact the legislation desired by Church, either for 
the territories or for the Federal Government. When North Dakota 
became a State, one year later, the item veto was included in the 
State Constitution as a part of the governor's veto power over 
legislation.
The gubernatorial veto power in the Dakota Territory was both 
weakened and strengthened because of its use or misuse by the governors* 
The actions of the territorial governors as well as the territorial 
legislatures, would certainly be remembered when statehood was planned 
by the founding fathers of North Dakota.
^-Report of the Governor of Dakota to the Secretary of the 
Interior 1888 (Washington: Government Press), p. 55*
CHAPTER II
VETO AS EXERCISED BY NORTH DAKOTA GOVERNORS TO 1961
By the time North Dakota's Constitution was written, it was 
taken for granted that the governor should have the veto power. The 
Constitutional Convention did not lack for information when it created 
the North Dakota Constitution. Many of the state constitutions were 
represented. The delegates were all supplied with copies of the 
constitution of South Dakota, wThich had already been adopted by the 
popular vote of that proposed state.^ The Committee on the Executive 
Department, which was responsible for developing the veto power of the 
governor, reported their recommendations to the convention. The 
committee's report in part was as follows:
Section 9» Every bill which shall have passed the Legis­
lature, shall before it becomes a law, be presented to the 
Governor. If he approve, he shall sign, but if not he shall 
return it with his objections to the house in which it originated, 
which shall enter the objection at large upon the Journal and 
proceed to reconsider it. If after such reconsideration two- 
thirds of the members present shall agree to pass the bill, 
it shall be sent, together with the objection, to the other 
house, by which it- shall likewise be reconsidered, and if it 
be approved by two-thirds of the members present, it shall be­
come a law; but in all such cases the vote of both houses shall 
be determined by yeas and nays, and the names of the members 
voting for and against the bill shall be entered upon the 
Journal of each house respectively. If any bill shall not 
be returned by the Governor within three days (Sundays 
excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the 




adjournment present its return, in which case it shall be 
filed with his objections in the office of the Secretary of 
State, within fifteen days after such adjournment, or become 
a law.
Section 10. The Governor shall have the power to dis­
approve on any item or items or part or parts of any bill 
making appropriations of money or property embracing distinct 
items and part or parts of the bill approved shall be law, 
and the item or items and part or parts disapproved shall be 
void, unless enacted in the following manner: If the Legis­
lature be in session he shall transmit to the house in which 
the bill originated a copy of the item or items or part or 
parts thereof disapproved, together with his objection thereto, 
and the items or parts objected to shall be separately reconsid­
ered, and each item or part shall then take the same course as 
is prescribed for the passage of bills over the executive
veto.^
Section nine would allow the governor time after adjournment 
of the legislature to consider bills. This was something that the 
territorial governors were not granted. One other change from the 
territorial governor's veto power, included in Section nine, was the 
removal of the pocket veto. If he did not sign the bills in the time 
alioted after adjournment, the bills became law. Under territorial 
government, all legislation ended at the time of final adjournment 
of the Legislative Assembly.
Section ten, if accepted by the convention, vrauld create the 
item veto for the governor. This was the type of veto power that 
Territorial Governor Church had requested from the Congress. The 
wording of this proposal appears to be very clear as tc what the 
governor can do with the item veto. But governors would interpret 
the meaning differently, as will be noted later.
The Committee of the Whole recommended that Sections nine and
^Journal of the Constitutional Convention for North Dakota 
Tribune (Bismarck: State Printers and Binders, 1839)7 ppV 133-13^•
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ten be adopted by the convention. Very little debate was carried on 
in the convention over the veto power of the governor. Mr. Killer 
moved to strike out the word "present" and insert the word "elected" 
wherever it occurred in that section as used in that sense.^ This 
was adopted. This change in Section nine would make the veto a little 
more difficult to override than it was in the territorial government. 
Formerly, a two-thirds vote of the members present was necessary for 
the legislature to override a veto. The change would require a 
definite number of the elected membership of each house to pass over 
the governor's veto.
There was little additional change from the report of the 
Committee on the Executive Department and the article was adopted by 
the convention. There are four sections in the North Dakota 
Constitution containing provisions on the gubernatorial veto power. 
Section twenty-five denies the governor veto power over measures 
initiated by or referred to the electors. Section seventy-nine 
details the veto procedure and the manner of the legislature over­
riding the governor's veto. Section eighty contains the item veto 
power and the method for overriding this type of veto. Section 
eighty-one places limitations on certain actions of the governor. 
Included in this section is the possible punishment of a governor 




•̂ North Dakota, Constitution. See Appendix A for conplete 
sections on governor veto power.
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Since the adoption of the Executive Article in the North 
Dakota Constitution, in 1889, the original section on the governor's 
veto power has not been changed or altered by constitutional amend­
ment. The last attempt to change the veto power of the governor 
occurred in 1966. A proposed constitutional amendment to allow the 
governor to reduce items in appropriation bills was defeated by the 
voters by 69,116 to 84,131 votes.^ Governor William Langer, during 
his terms as chief executive, did reduce or pare items in appropriation 
bills. No legal action was taken to challenge his reduction of various 
items and the reductions remained in effect.
North Dakota has been classified as a state having a strong 
executive veto. This classification is because of allowing the 
governor ten or more days for consideration of bills after adjournment, 
requiring two-thirds of the elected members to override a veto, and
7allowing the governor to veto items in appropriation bills. In 
North Dakota every bill passed by both houses of the Legislative 
Assembly must be presented to the governor for his approval or 
rejection. If during the session the governor disapproves a bill, 
he is constitutionally obligated to return it to the house where it 
originated accompanied by a veto message stating his objections. If 
the legislature is not in session, the governor must file the veto 
with the Secretary of State. A veto during the session may be over­
ridden by a two-thirds vote of the elected members of each house.
During the legislative session the governor has three days, not
%orth Dakota, Session Laws, 1967, p. 1226.
?For the entire criteria for judging the relative strength of 
the veto in each state, see Prescott, p. 100.
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counting Sundays, in which to act on the bill. After adjournment of 
the Legislative Assembly the period for consideration is extended to 
fifteen days Sundays being counted. In either case, if the governor 
does not sign or veto the bill, it becomes a law as though the 
governor had signed it. Unlike the President of the United States,
O
the governor of North Dakota does not possess the pocket veto.
North Dakota governors do not have the veto power over all 
forms of legislation. The state constitution prohibits the exercise 
of the veto over any initiative or referendum measures.^
The governor of North Dakota also has the veto power over 
actions of the State Industrial Commission. This power was given 
him by the legislature in 1919* House Bill 17 was an act to create 
the State Industrial Commission and the veto power was included in 
the act.^ This law was referred to the voters on June 26, 1919» 
for their approval or rejection. The voters gave their approval to 
House Bill 17 by a vote of 61,188 yes as opposed to 50,271 no votes.^ 
The wording of the governor's veto power, in the bill, seemingly 
indicated that the governor had an absolute veto over the actions of 
the Commission.
QThe procedure, for overriding a veto in North Dakota is 
similar in one respect to the national practice. The North Dakota 
Constitution requires the house of origin to reconsider the governor's 
veto as does the national government.
^North Dakota, Session Laws, 1919. pp. 503-50^* In 1918 North 
Dakota adopted, by Constitutional Amendment, the initiative and 
referendum. The veto power of the Governor was not extended to the 
measures initiated by or referred to the Electors.
10Ibid., pp. 215-218.
^ T b id ., p. 509 •
2b
In 1928, a North Dakota State Supreme Court ruling was 
rendered which limited the governor's veto power over the Industrial 
Commission. This action was the result of a court case brought by 
the Secretary of the Industrial Commission for his salary of the month 
of July, 1927.
During the legislative sessions of 1927, the governor had
vetoed an item in the appropriation bill for the Industrial Commission.
. , 12The item vetoed out was the salary of the Secretary, $5>600.
Secretary Gammon brought suit to recover his salary. The case 
eventually reached the State Supreme Court and the Court reached its 
decision in the case State ex rel. Gammon, Secretary of State 
Industrial Commission, v. Sorlie et al., State Auditing Board, on 
April 9, 1928.
The court ruled that the governor did not have the absolute
veto power to disallow all bills for administrative expenses of the 
13Commission. The court also ruled that the governor was not given 
the power to disallow the ordinary bills of the Industrial Commission
IZJ.incurred in the regular and usual conduct of its affairs. According 
to the Supreme Court, the governor did not have an absolute veto over 
the Industrial Commission.
During the twenty-third session of the legislature, 1933»
Senate Bill 195 was passed into law. This law amended, re-enacted and 
construed the previous laws relating to the State Industrial Commission.
•*~%orth Western Reporter, Vol. 219 (St. Paul: West Publishing 
Co., 1928), p. 106.
^ Ibid.. p. 105.
lZjTpid.. p. 110.
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Part of the law established an absolute veto, for the governor, over 
actions of the Commission. Under the law, not even the courts could 
question the governor's power. Section 3°8a^ reads in part:
All orders, rules, regulations, by-laws and written 
contracts, adopted or authorized by the Commission shall, 
before becoming effective, be approved by the Governor, as 
Chairman, and shall not be in force unless approved and signed 
by him. In the creation of the Industrial Commission, it was 
the intention of the Legislature, and it is the intention of 
this Legislature, that the Governor shall have full veto power 
and that any Act vetoed, or not approved and signed, by him, 
shall be null and void and of no effect. Any decision of any 
court to the contrary, notwithstanding.
The fortieth session of the State Legislative Assembly found
the House twice trying to remove the veto power over the Commission.
On the first attempt the failure of the constitutional majority
resulted in the bill being indefinitely postponed.^ A week later the
House considered House Bill 799 and passed the bill by a vote of
seventy to twenty-two, six members not voting, and sent it to the
Senate.^ The Senate acted on the advice of the Committee, to which
18the bill had been referred, and indefinitely postponed action.
There being no further Senate action on this bill, the bill did not 
become law.
The extent of the use of the gubernatorial veto by the 
governors of North Dakota is shown in Table 1 on the following page. 
The total figure of 523 vetoes includes all types of vetoes as 
exercised by the governors of North Dakota. The total includes the
"'■-’North Dakota, Session Laws, 1933. p. 299*
■'’ House Journal, 196?, p. 507*
17Ibid., p. 676.
^Senate Journal, 1967. p. 828.
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TABLE 1
INDIVIDUAL GUBERNATORIAL VETOES 1839-196?
















John Miller, R 1 13 2 15 1
Andrew H. Burke, R 2 3 0 3 0Eli C. D. Shortridge, D 1 17 1 18 0
Roger Allin. R 1 22 8 30 0
Frank A. Briggs, R 1 2 10 12 10
Joseph M. Devine, R 0 0 0 0 0
Frederick B. Fancher, R 1 0 0 0 0
Frank V,Elite, R 2 13 5 18 0
E. Y..Sarles, R 1- 15 9 24 0
John Burke, D 3 32 18 5 0a 0
L. B. Hanna, R 2 31 14 ^5 0Iynn J. Frazier, R 5 20 11 31b 0
R. A. Nestos, R. 1 11 18 29 0
A. G. Sorlie, R 3 24 2 26 0
Walter Haddock, R 0 0 0 0 0
George F. Schafer, R 2 16 2 18 0
William Langer, R 3 42 49 91 0
Ole H. Olson, R 0 0 0 0 0
Thos H. Hoodie, D 0 0 0 0 0
Walter Welford, R 1 12 4 16 0
John Moses, D 4 18 2 20 0
Fred Aandahl, R 3 10 1 11 1
Norman Brunsdale, R 3 8 1 9 0
John E. Davis, R 2 4 0 4 0
William L. Guy, D 5 49 4 53 7
Total ^7 362 161 523 19
aVetoed a $25 concurrent resolution. See footnote 44.
^Vetoed concurrent resolution. See footnote 45.
Sources: Regular and Special Session Laws IS9O-I967. 
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vetoes that were successful, those overridden by the legislature and 
vetoes that were recalled by the legislature and changed to meet the 
objections. Two concurrent resolutions, that were vetoed, are included 
in the totals.
Of the twenty-one governors that had the opportunity to veto 
bills passed by the Legislative Assemblies of North Dakota, only one 
governor didn’t use this power to check the legislature. Governor 
Frederick B. Fancher, in the session of IB99, did not issue one veto 
message.^9 There have been forty regular sessions of the North Dakota 
Legislative Assembly, and in only three sessions did the governors 
find it unnecessary to veto legislation. Besides Fancher, Governor 
Norman Brunsdale, in one session, and Governor John Davis, in one 
session, appeared to be in harmony with the legislature and did not 
use the veto power once. In the seven special sessions of the 
legislature, that have been called, the governor's veto has been used 
in three of the sessions.
As indicated in Table 1, Governor William L. Guy has exercised 
the greatest number of full vetoes of any governor, forty-nine.
Governor William Langer used the item veto the greatest number of 
times, also forty-nine. The record holder for the total number of 
vetoes, full and item,'is also Governor Langer. During his tenure 
in the governors1 office, Langer vetoed ninety-one bills passed hy 
the legislature.
Table 2 on the following page shows a breakdown of the vetoes 
in ten year periods. The greatest exercise of the veto power was in
■^Governors Devine, Maddock, Olson and Moodie did not use the 
veto as there was no legislative session.
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1889-1900 20 53 11 78
1901-1910 5 67 0 72
1911-1920 2 90 0 92
1921-1930 8 62 0 70
1931-194) 22 99 0 121
1941-1950 4 20 1 24
1951-1960 2 11 0 13
1961-1967 15 38 7 53
Totals 78 445 19 523
Sources: Regular and Special Session Laws 1890-1967* 
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the years 1931-1943 when 121 vetoes were issued. It is significant to 
note in Table 2 the number of vetoes that were exercised after the 
legislature had adjourned as compared to the number of vetoes before 
adjournment. This factor had a great influence upon the number of 
vetoes that were overridden.
As Table 2 indicates, there have been more vetoes used after 
rather than during, the legislative sessions in North Dakota. This 
is due, in part, to the legislature submitting a great number of 
bills to the governor during the final three days of the sessions.
By sending legislation to the governor in the last three days of the 
session, the legislature is almost unable to override a governor’s 
veto. Since the governor has fifteen days after adjournment to veto
29
a bill, the legislature by sending so many measures to the executive 
in the final three days removes the opportunity to override a veto. 
One other reason for few vetoes issued before adjournment, has been 
the political party relationship between the executive branch and 
the legislative branch. Of the twenty-five men who have held the 
office of governor, only five have been Democrats. Only once have 
the Democrats controlled one house of the legislature, that being 
in 1965 when the House of Representatives was controlled by the 
Democratic Party.2x It is significant to note that in this session 
of the legislature, Governor Guy exercised his veto power the fewest 
number of times.
The gubernatorial veto in North Dakota has not been in 
exclusive control of one political party. Both Democratic and 
Republican governors have exercised the gubernatorial veto to varying 
degrees. Table 3 on the following page breaks the veto into use by 
political party. The Republican governors have vetoed 382 bills 
as compared to 141 vetoes for the four Democratic governors. Table 
3 also indicates the number of vetoes by party before and after 
adjournment. The Republicans also have had the most vetoes over­
ridden. A total breakdown by party governors is found in Tables 
4A and 43 on the following pages.
^North Dakota, Blue Book, I96I, p. 130.
^-Grand Forks Herald, January 1, 1967. p. 6.
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COMBINED DEMOCRAT AND REPUBLICAN GOVERNORS VETOES
TABLE 3
No. of Governors No. of
Exercising Veto Before After Total Overrode Sessions
Republicans 17 55 327 382 12 34
Democrats 4 23 118 141 7 13
Total 21 78 445 523 19 47
Sources: Regular and Special Session Laws I89O-I967. 














Guy 15 38 53 7 5 1
Moses 2 18 20 0 4 0
Moodie 0 •  • •  • •  • 0 •  •
J. Burke 4 46 50 0 3 0
Shortridge 2 is- 18 0 1 0
Total 23 118 141 7 13 1
Sources: Regular and Special Session laws I89O-I967. 









Republicans 3efore After Total Overrode
Regular and 
Special Sessions
No. of Houses 
Controlled by 
Democrats
Miller 5 10 15 1 1 0
A. Burke 0 3 3 0 2 0
Allin 3 27 30 0 1 0
Briggs 10 2 12 10 1 0
Devine 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fancher 0 0 0 0 1 0
White 1 17 18 0 2 0
Sarles 0 24 24 0 1 0
Hanna 1 44 45 0 2 0
Frazier 1 30 31 0 5 0
Nestos 0 29 29 0 1 0
Sorlie 7 19 26 0 3 0
Maddock 0 • • 0 0 0 0
Schafer 1 17 18 0 2 0
Langer 21 70 91 0 3 0
Olson 0 • • 0 0 0 0
Welford 1 15 16 0 1 0
Aandahl 2 9 11 1 3 0
3runsdale 1 8 9 0 3 0
Davis 1 3 4 0 2 0
Total 55 327 382 12 34 0
Sources: Regular and Special Session Laws 1890-1967* 
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The use of the gubernatorial veto in North Dakota has been 
successful in relation to the number of vetoes overridden by the two- 
thirds majority of the elective members of the North Dakota Legislature. 
As was previously stated, only four governors have experienced their 
vetoes being overruled by the legislature. Governor Miller was the 
first to have a veto overridden. His veto for the creation and
32
support of the Deaf and Dumb School was overruled. Governor Frank
Briggs was the next governor to feel the sting of the legislature’s 
action. Briggs vetoed ten appropriation bills and had the displeasure 
of having all ten bills overridden. In his message to the Senate, 
Briggs listed several reasons for his action. One of his complaints 
is today still a complaint of most governors who receive legislation 
late in the session. Briggs’ message clearly shows the problem:
I regret the fact that these measures cannot receive my 
approval, but the reasons to me are so apparent that my 
duties seem plain.
If there is any legislation that should receive careful 
and painstaking consideration it is certainly that of provid­
ing for the maintenance of our public institutions. Ample 
time should be given committees to discuss and pass upon 
appropriation bills, and if this be true of committees it 
would appear that the executive ought to be accorded the 
courtesy of a reasonable time to consider these matters.
In the present instance these bills come to the executive 
eight hours prior to the final adjournment of your honorable 
body. It certainly will not be contended that this is 
sufficient time to give to such important legislation.
The total amount appropriated in the bills herewith 
returned without my approval in my opinion is largely in 
excess of the expected revenue. Careful estimates have been 
made by the state auditor and state treasurer as to the prob­
able income for the biennial period under the present laws, 
and to this has been added a liberal allowance for revenue 
contemplated under pending legislation. Yet, the fact remains 
that there will be insufficient funds to meet these appropria­
tion bills. Assuming liabilities in excess of possible receipts 
is not a good business proposition, and I do not believe that 
a single member of your honorable body would consider it so 
were the same conditions applied to his own affairs.^3
The legislature didn't concur with Briggs' message and by their action
overrode all ten appropriation vetoes.
Governor William Guy faced a similar problem in the 1967 
session of the Fortieth Legislative Assembly. In Guy's veto of the *2
22
22Senate Journal, 1889, p. 902. House Journal, 1889, p. 1^21.
2̂ Senate Journal, 1897, pp. 618-619.
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three-fourths percent sales tax increase, he states that the bill was 
conceived late in the session and, "delivered on ny desk hi hours 
later, wet, dripping and struggling."2 2̂ Guy also experienced having 
his veto overridden by the legislature. In fact, of the ten vetoes 
of Governor Guy before adjournment seven were overridden.
The only other governor besides the aforementioned to have a 
veto overridden was Fred Aandahl in 19^5* Aandahl vetoed a bill 
giving additional expense money to the legislators only to have the 
legislature override the veto the day after the Governor’s message 
was read in both houses.2^
A good measure of the governor's influence is the relatively 
small number of gubernatorial vetoes that have been overridden. In 
all but four of the regular and special sessions of the North Dakota 
Legislature, the veto was absolute. This fact may be due to the 
constitutional limitations, to the legislature sending much of the 
legislation to the governor in the final days of the session and to 
the political relationship between the executive office and the two 
houses of the Legislative Assembly. The greatest number of full 
vetoes overridden occurred when the governor was a Democrat and the 
two houses of the legislature were overwhelmingly Republican controlled.
In most states',''early governors used the veto sparingly to 
protect themselves from what they considered to be an unconstitutional 
enroachment on their authority by the legislature. It was also used 
to thwart what was thought to be unconstitutional legislative bills.
2^Grand Forks Herald, February 28, 1967, p. 1.
23Grand Forks Herald, February 20, 19^5, P* !•
2%orey, p. 3h
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Governor John Miller, first Governor of North Dakota, vetoed five 
bills on the grounds the bills were unconstitutional.
Table 5 lists eight reasons for gubernatorial vetoes in 
North Dakota. The most common reason listed in the veto messages 
were in the interests of economy. The most common statement found 
is "appropriations exceed revenue." Most of the item vetoes fall 
into this category. The second reason for governors vetoing legis­
lation was in the public interest or unsound public policy. Frank
Prescott, in his nationwide study of reasons given by governors for
27using the veto, found this reason to be the most common. Remove 
the item vetoes from the reasons given by North Dakota governors, for 
use of the veto, and Prescott’s most common reason would also apply 
in North Dakota. In some of the veto messages, more than one reason 
for the veto was given by the governor. What is listed in Table 5 
is what this researcher considered the major reason for the governor’s 
vetoes.
Table 6 breaks down the reasons for vetoes by a ten year 
period. This chart indicates a desire for economy during the 
depression years.
The item veto originated in Georgia during the period of the 
28Southern Confederacy. Forty-one states provide for an executive
29veto of items in appropriation bills. Originally the device was *2
^Prescott, p. 109.
2®Morey, p. 41.
^ Book of the States 1964-65, pp. 58-59*
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GOVERNORS' REASONS FOR VETOING BILLS
TABLE 5
Item Item Item Item Item Item Item Item
Governor 1 2 3 k 5 6 7 8 Total
Miller 2 3 5 1 0 0 0 k 15
A. Burke 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 • • 3
Shortridge 2 1 k 2 0 5 0 k 18
Allin 10 3 2 8 0 1 0 6 30
Briggs 10 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 12
Fancher 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
White 9 2 0 0 1 1 0 5 18
Sarles 16 7 0 0 1 0 0 0 2k
J. Burke 29 8 8 •3 1 0 0 1 50
Hanna 28 9 1 0 1 0 5 1 45
Frazier 17 3 3 k 1 2 1 0 31
Nestos 23 k 0 1 0 0 1 0 29
Sorlie 7 11 1 0 7 0 0 0 26
Shafer 3 9 1 0 3 1 0 1 18
Welford 6 3 0 0 1 0 6 0 16
Langer 61 18 0 2 9 0 0 1 91
Moses 5 7 5 1 0 1 0 1 20
Aandahl 3 6 2 0 0 0 0 0 11
Brunsdale 2 2 1 1 2 0 0 1 9
Davis 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Guy 10 35 1 0 k 2 1 0 53



















economy or tax burden.
public interest or unsound public policy, 
unconstitutional or unlawful, 
duplication or conflicts with present law. 
unnecessary.
defective drafting, clarity or not properly
poor law or present law best, 
miscellaneous or reasons unknown.
The classification scheme for this table is based upon that 
used by Prescott, p. 109.
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REASONS FOR VETOES BY TEN YEAR PERIODS
TABLE 6
Item Item Item Item Item Item Item Item
Years 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Total
1889-1900 24 8 13 12 0 6 0 15 78
1901-1910 43 14 4 71 3 1 0 6 72
1911-1920 54 15 8 6 2 0 6 1 92
1921-1930 35 19 2 1 8 3 1 1 70
1931-1940 72 28 0 2 12 0 6 1 121
1941-1950 3 11 7 1 0 1 0 1 24
1951-1960 3 5 1 1 2 0 0 1 13
1961-1967 10 35 1 0 4 2 1 0 53



















the economy or tax burden.
the public interest or unsound public policy, 
unconstitutional or unlawful, 
duplication or conflicts with present law. 
unnecessary.
defective drafting, clarity or not properly
poor law or present law best, 
miscellaneous or reasons unknown.
The classification scheme for this table is based upon that 
used by Prescott, p. 109•
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adopted to check improper or unconstitutional grants of money according 
30to Prescott.
The item veto has been a part of the veto power of North Dakota
^Oprescott, p. 106
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governors since the state’s beginning. Some of the governors have used 
the power sparingly or not at all, while others wielded the 'knife* 
to a great extent. "In itself," says Negley, "this did not constitute 
a major concession. . . .but significance lies in the fact that this 
provision provided the one additional power necessary to make the 
veto a potential 'stick' in the hands of any governor inclined to 
use it."3^ Except for Governor Briggs, the item veto has been a 
potential 'stick* in the hands of North Dakota governors.
Table 7 on the following page shows the number of item vetoes 
by governors and the amount of appropriations itemed out of the bills. 
Note should be made of the amount of money removed from the appropria­
tion bills by Governor Langer, as he pared or reduced the amounts of 
money as well as itemed out parts of the bill. Earlier governors had 
desired to do this, but did not think it was constitutional. Governor 
R. A. Nestos in explanation of an item veto said in part:
Unfortunately the executive is limited in his vetoes by 
the requirement that each item must either be disallowed in 
full or permitted to stand, even though considered excessive.
This situation makes it doubly difficult to make reductions 
without injury to the institutions affected.-'2
Governor Langer was of the opinion that he had the authority
to reduce or pare items in appropriation bills and stated that he
intended to use this power: to reduce state taxes to a point where
the taxpayers could afford to pay the expense of operating the 
33state government. The Herald reported that Langer said the
-^Glenn R. Negley, "The Executive Veto in Illinois," American 
Political Science Review, XXXIII (December, 1939), p. 1052.
^^Grand Forks Herald, March 11, 1923, p. 1.
^ Grand Forks Herald. March 12, 1933» P« !•
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TABLE 7

























aAll money restored by legislature overriding item vetoes.
^Langer reduced or pared items in appropriation bills.
Sources; Regular and Special Session Laws 1890-1967.
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Attorney-General had ruled that the governor had authority to reduce
34items in appropriation bills and veto single items in any bill.
The Attorney-General's ruling was not recorded in the newspaper story.
34Ibid.. March 19, 1933, P* 1
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The only ruling relating to the veto power, during this tine period, 
was if the governor had the power to veto an emergency clause of a 
legislative act without vetoing the body of the act. In discussing 
the question it was taken for granted that the act in question was 
not an appropriation bill. The Attorney-General ruled the governor
35could not veto an emergency clause.
In 1935 P» 0. Sathre, the new Attorney-General issued an 
opinion that governors could not ’scale down' items of appropriation 
measures. In the ruling Sathre was of the opinion:
That under Section 80 of our Constitution the Governor 
may veto in toto, any or all of the items of an appropriation 
bill, but he may not reduce or scale down or in any manner 
change, except by elimination of a whole item, any of the 
items of such appropriation.
Ten years later, after Langer’s action, Governor John Hoses 
said he was without power to pare items, but could veto entire items. 
Moses referred to Langer’s action by relating that Langer had a 
friendly administration in all state departments and there was little 
chance that his action would be challenged in court; it was not 
challenged. Hoses referred to his own administration by saying 
". . .unfortunately the present governor does not have such friendly 
co-operation in all state departments and any such action on his part
35•^Report of the Attorney General of North Dakota to the 
Governor July 1, 1932 to June 30, 1934. (Bismarck), pp. 143-144.
This writer could not find a specific ruling that allowed the governor 
to reduce items in appropriation bills. The ruling stated in the text 
could be the ruling to which Langer referred. This ruling was made on 
March 9. 1933*
^ Report of the Attorney General of North Dakota to the 
Governor July 1, 1934 to June 30. 1936. (Bismarck), pp. 5-7*
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would undoubtedly be challenged at the first opportunity. . .".37 
Governor Moses was a Democrat faced with a Republican controlled 
legislature and most of the executive offices also were filled with 
Republicans.
The States of Pennsylvania, California and Massachusetts have 
given the governor the power to reduce items in appropriation bills 
as well as reject them.3® To allow North Dakota governors this 
additional power would require a constitutional amendment approved 
by the voters. One such attempt was made in 1966, but the amendment 
lost.
Of the 161 item vetoes, all but two have involved a sum of
money. Governor Guy in 1967 vetoed two bills that would transfer
funds between line items. No definite sum of money was involved or
removed from the bills. No one has challenged these vetoes on the
grounds of constitutionality. One person interviewed at the Capitol
building was of the opinion that the vetoes were illegal. However,
he pointed out that the only persons involved in the matter were
appointees of Governor Guy. He ventured the opinion that he doubted
39that a challenge would be made.
The use of the veto by some governors has been their political
undoing. Governor A. Burke’s veto of a bill, by the farmers’ alliance,
40helped to defeat his try for a second term. Governor Allin’s veto
37prand Forks Herald, March 21, 1943, p. 1.
33prescott, p. 108.
3%ersonal interview with member of the Legislative Research
Staff.
Ilf)Lounsberry, Early History of North Dakota (Washington:
Liberty Press, 1919), pp. 425-426."
of appropriation bills was the main factor that made Allin unavailable
41as a candidate for re-election.
North Dakota governors when vetoing complete bills have 
usually given detailed explanations in their messages accompanying 
the veto to the legislature. While messages on item vetoes have 
usually been short, the standard statement usually has been "appro­
priations exceed the estimated income."
A question arises when studying some of the appropriation 
vetoes of Governor Langer in 1933* There are some discrepancies 
noticeable in the money figures in some of the bills. A good example 
is Senate Bill 46: An Appropriation for Capitol Building and Grounds. 
The legislature appropriated $78,626.00 in this bill. In Langer's 
partial veto message, he approved $69,050.00. Or in other words, he 
reduced the amount $9,576.00. Further on in his message, the 
Governor listed each separate reduction in the bill. These reductions 
are listed below:
Maintenance reduced to $50,000 from $56,076.
Improve and repairs reduced to $2,500 from $5,000.
Trees, shrubs reduced to $1,000 from $3,000.4^
The total amount reduced in the three items listed above was $10,576 
or a $1,000 difference between the Governor's statement as to how 
much he would allow and "his itemized statement in the veto message.
No explanation for this discrepancy or others found in similar 
appropriation bills could be found. The original Senate Bill 46 was
41 /Lewis F. Crawford, History of North Dakota, Vol. I (Chicago
and New York: The American Historical Society, Inc., 1931). P* 384.
^torth Dakota, Session Laws, 1933. pp. 47-48.
studied by this writer in the Secretary of State's vault, and the 
wording is identical with the veto message found in the Session Laws
of 1933*
There has been one major court decision relating to the 
gubernatorial veto in North Dakota. House Bill *+10 was vetoed by 
Governor John Burke after the adjournment of the legislature. The 
veto was challenged on the grounds that the fifteen day period for 
vetoing after adjournment had elapsed. The petitioners were of the 
opinion that the bill was law because the Governor had not signed or 
vetoed the bill in the allotted time period.
In the court case North Dakota State ex rel. Watkins v Norton 
(1911) 21 N.D. ^73, 131 N. U. 257, the Supreme Court of North Dakota 
ruled that Sundays were included in the fifteen day period. In the 
Court1s opinion:
The Framers of the Constitution were dealing with two 
distinct periods of time having no similarity, and if they 
intended to exclude intervening Sundays as to the larger 
period of time fixed by them, it is reasonable to assume that 
they would have expressly so provided. •'
This is the only override of a governor's veto in North Dakota by any
other method than the two-thirds vote of the legislature.
There is evidence that two governors of North Dakota used the 
veto power on concurrent resolutions passed by the two houses of the 
legislature. This is not possible at the present time. Governor John 
Burke vetoed a twenty-five dollar appropriation to the Lincoln Farm 
Association for the purchase, development and preservation of the
^ American law Reports Annotated, Vol. 5^ (Rochester: E. R. 
Andrews Printing Co’., 1928), p. 3^1.
The other veto of a con-hjtLincoln farm in the State of Kentucky, 
current resolution was by Governor Frazier in 1917* The resolution 
would have provided for a special committee to investigate and report, 
on legislation for relief of floods in the eastern part of the state. 
Frazier cited a state supreme court opinion of 1909 in his veto 
message on the construction of appropriations bills. Frazier gave 
a part of the court's opinion when he stated:
The general appropriation bill shall embrace nothing but 
appropriation for expense of the executive, legislative and 
judicial departments of the State, the interest on the public 
debt and for public schools. All other appropriations shall 
be made by special bills, each embracing but one subject.
Frazier's objection to the concurrent resolution was on the grounds
the act was not constitutional. No definite amount of money was
provided for the purpose contemplated by the act.
Governors of North Dakota have, at times, accomplished their 
aims by not actually vetoing the bill, but by threatening to veto 
the bill. It is almost impossible to determine the effects of a veto 
threat on the legislators, but the threat may exist in the minds of 
the legislators when they are determining legislation. Governor 
Killer, during the first session of the Legislative Assembly, 
threatened to veto a Louisiana lottery bill. The bill caused a great 
deal of controversy at"the time and Miller's threatened veto aided 
in preventing it from becoming law. The Bismarck Settler said of 
Miller: "Let it be written on one of the brightest and cleanest
^Grand Forks Herald, March 2k, 1907. p. 1. For veto message 
see March 27. 1907. p. 8. For complete text of this concurrent 
resolution see Senate Journal, 1907. pp. 1C60-1061.
^Kouse Journal, 1917. PP* ^60-^61. Fraizer later approved 
this resolution, p. 757*
was a nan of such integrity that the gang of lottery agents and
schemers counted in advance upon his veto."^ Miller didn't have
to veto the lottery bill because it failed to pass the Assembly.
One type of legislation that constantly received a threat of
a gubernatorial veto was on appropriation bills. Governors at various
times have announced that they would cut or scale down items unless
the legislature presented him appropriation bills the governor
considered economically sound. Governor Allin did this in 1895
when he threatened to veto appropriation bills, unless recalled and
hnscaled down by the legislature. ' The threat was not successful
since Allin had to use the partial veto on appropriation bills.
A governor must use caution when he contemplates the threat
of a veto or he may find himself in legal difficulty. Section 81 of
the North Dakota Constitution states the general punishment for a
h8governor who threatens use of the veto. The specific punishment is
found in the North Dakota Century Code 12-08-18. Governor Langer
was attacked by the presiding officer of the Senate, Lieutenant
Governor T. H. H. Thoresen, for Langer's threat to veto appropriations.
Thoresen in a message to the Senate on the threat said:
A message came into this body threatening this Senate 
that unless they did so and so that further appropriations
^ Grand Forks Herald, February 13, 1890, p. 2.
^ Grand Forks Herald. February 2h, 1895« P» 1*
^North Dakota Constitution, Article III, Section 81.
^North Dakota Century Code, Vol. II (Indianapolis: The Allen 
Smith Co., I960), p. 543. See Appendix B for specific punishment.
pages of history that the first governor of the State of North Dakota
would be vetoed, in direct conflict with Section 81 of the 
Constitution of the State of North Dakota.-5°
Thoresen accused Langer of using the veto as a club over the heads of
Senators causing many Senators to vote against personal convictions
on several bills in order to protect state institutions in their
home communities which would suffer if appropriation bills were vetoed.
The Herald records Thoresen as saying on this subject:
It is not true democracy to be forced to vote against your 
own convictions, it is not a government of and for the people 
if a legislator is not allowed to vote as his conscience 
dictates but must follow the demands of one who wants to be 
a dictator.51
Nothing happened to Langer because of his threatened veto, but the 
possibility of legal action against a governor still remains if 
someone should ever challenge the threat of a veto upon action of 
the legislature.
The governors of North Dakota have received praise as well as 
criticism for their use of the gubernatorial veto throughout the 
history of North Dakota. The veto of a bill might have an effect 
on certain people, industry or business. These groups may react, to 
the veto, in various ways. In the study of newspaper articles on 
the governor’s veto, a great deal more criticism, rather than 
complimentary material, is found over the use of the veto. Beginning 
with the first governor, criticism has been levied against many 
governors for the use of the veto. It was contended that Governor 
Miller should be deprived of his veto power except passing upon the 
constitutionality of any measure. One critic thought that the
•5°Senate Journal, 1937» P* 1607.
5̂ -Grand Forks Herald, March 11, 1937* p* 1.
legislation was desirable because they were fresh from the people.
The Herald, in an editorial remarked that the critic evidently forgot
52that the Governor and the legislature were elected the same day.
One veto of a Senate bill by Governor Killer resulted in the 
appointing of a Senate veto committee. The committee was to examine 
the reason assigned by the Governor for his veto and present their 
findings to the Senate. The Governor had listed several reasons for 
his veto in his message to the Senate based mainly on conflicts with 
rulings of the Supreme Court of Dakota Territory. The Senate veto 
committee reported that each reason given by the Governor was 
untenable and not supported by authorities cited nor by the principal 
invoked to maintain it.
The committee also reported that if the veto had been based 
on the ground that the proposed legislation was superfluous, there 
would have been some merit to the executive action. The committee 
also questioned why this illegal legislation had been permitted to 
remain unquestioned on the statue books for the past five years.
One interesting quotation was used by the committee in its 
report when the committee compared the present conditions to those 
faced by the mayor of the city welcoming Henry of Navaire. The 
mayor said;
I know it is the custom to greet renowned warriors like 
your Majesty with the thunder of cannon; but I have twenty- 
one reasons why we cannot comply with such customs
1. We never had a cannon in this city;
2. We - -
legislature was better qualified than the Governor to decide what
^^Grand Forks Herald, March 11, 1890, p. 2
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Hold, said the King, your first is sufficient, we will 
dispense with the remaining twenty.-53
The committee stated it could assign numerous reasons for its action,
but an all-sufficient and controlling one to its mind was that the
proposed legislation was parallel, just and constitutional. In the
opinion of the committee, the Governor's veto was not based upon either
of the objections indicated, but upon erroneous application of the
law.
The committee's report did not have an effect on the veto of 
Senate Bill 172. Governor Miller's veto remained in force.
Governor Allin was praised by the Herald for vetoing appro­
priation bills for other than political or popular reasons. The 
editorial states the Governor:
Doesn't care one iota for future political preferment or 
approval for political reasons. He has simply performed 
an act he thought best for the taxpayers of the State, and 
he is doubtless perfectly willing to shoulder the full 
re sponsibility.54
Allin by shouldering his responsibility contributed in bringing his 
political life, as Governor, to an end. His own political party 
refused to nominate him for a second term of office.55 phe Governor 
also experienced a great deal of protest for his reductions of money 
to the state educational institutions.
Governor Briggs earned praise for his veto of a bill which 
would have violated all Republican party pledges concerning prohibition. 
The Herald editorial page comments on the veto of House Bill 209:
53senate Journal, 1889-90, pp. 831-32.
^Grand Forks Herald, March 23, 1895, P* 2.
55Lounsberry, p. 428.
The veto shows Briggs to be what the Republican party- 
believed when they nominated him, and what the people believed 
when they elected him —  a loyal and independent capable man 
who could be depended upon to administer the affairs of state 
ably, economically, honorably, in accordance with the known 
wishes of the people and the Republican party.5°
Briggs’ vetoes of appropriations were also praised, on the grounds he
didn't have tine to study them and by using his veto he had made good
a campaign pledge. This pledge was to place responsibility for all
evil consequences where it belonged - upon the legislature.
One method of handling appropriation bills was the method 
used by Governor White. In a stoxy about White and his handling of 
legislation, the Bismarck Correspondent stated the Governor had been 
kind to bills and had signed all but appropriation bills "these he 
left to the tail end, as a kid leaves the good things to the last."-^
When asked what he would do with these bills, White replied:
I have set aside several of them for closer scrutiny.
They have been 'found guilty,' but are not yet sentenced,, 
which would indicate a good pruning in the near future, 
probably a day or two.5"
Governor White was attacked for vetoing a bill and signing 
other legislation. White vetoed two bills that would provide appro­
priations for a childrens home in Fargo and one in Bismarck on the 
grounds of economy. A headline in the Herald read, "Governor White 
Favored Thousands for Wolf Bounty But Not a Cent for Orphans."59
The tenure of Governor John Burke, the second Democrat elected
5%rand Forks Herald, March 13, 1897. p. 2.
^ Bismarck Correspondent as cited in the Grand Forks Herald, 
March 18, 1903. p. 5*
58Ibid.
^ Grand Forks Herald, March 16, 1903. p. 1.
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governor, received criticism'over the use of the veto. The Fargo 
Forum and Daily Republican attacked the Governor for his veto of the 
state penitentary bill as being political. The writer thought that 
if the Governor had signed the bill, I. P. Bailey, a well known local 
Democrat, would lose his job as Treasurer of the Penitentary. The 
Governor was also criticized for his appropriation vetoes, because he 
overlooked all measures relating to Devils Lake, his home town.^
The farmers of North Dakota were told that Burke trimmed them by his 
veto and they were chided for electing him. The Forum told the 
farmer:
The action of the Governor shows the mistakes made by 
Republican farmers in going to another party for an executive 
who is antagonistic to their interest. . .Look over the list 
and see where the farmers got Burke's knife right in the 
neck. 1
■Whether the farmers took notice of this complaint is not known, but 
the fact remains, Burke was re-elected in 1911 to a third term of 
office, the first Democrat or Republican to receive this honor.
The influence of others upon a governor to exercise his veto 
was attacked during Governor Frazier's administration. A number of 
Frazier's vetoes were denounced as being inspired by the work of 
Arthur C. Townley. The North Dakota Society of Equity denounced as 
a Townley veto Senate.Bill 84 which the society had worked for. ^ 
Townley's influence was referred to in the Herald when it reported 
on the Governor's actions. The Herald said the bill was not vetoed
^°Fargo Forum and Daily Republican, March 22, 1909. p. 7*
6lIbid., p. 1.
^^Grand Forks Herald, March 8, 1917. p. 5*
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by the Governor but that the veto had been written and put in type 
in the office of the Non-Partisan Leader days before Governor Frazier 
had affixed his name to the document. The hand of the Governor when he 
affixed his signature was guided by the hand of Townley.0^
A veto of a reapportionment bill in 1923 gave Governor Nestos
a favorable commendation from some newspaper editors and political
opponents. The Herald remarked that the Governor had risen above the
narrow lines of partisan politics and has acted with a high regard of
the laws of the entire state and not merely of the faction which
6helected him to office.
Support for one of Nestos' vetoes came from a man the veto 
would hurt. V. L. Mangura, the President of the Forestry School, 
approved the veto which caused the discontinuance of that school. 
President Mangum said the veto was for the good of the state as the 
school did not fulfill local needs or command solid support from 
Bottineau County.^ It is questionable if this type of support would 
be forthcoming for a gubernatorial veto today.
At times legislators complained about the governor's use of 
the veto or the language in the message accompanying the veto. In 
Governor Sorlie's veto of House Bill 83, the Governor charged that 
the bill was sponsored’by the insurance lobby. Representative Traynor 
took exception to the Governor's language in the veto message.
^ Ibid., March 17, 1917. p. 4.
^Grand Forks Herald, March 14, 1923. p. 4.
65Ibid., March 11, 1923, p. 3*
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Traynor said he wasn't sponsored by a lobby of any kind but acted
66in the interests of his constituents.
A Langer veto of dairy funds received a retort from the 
Commissioner of Agriculture and Labor in 1933* Commissioner John 
Husby complained that the Dairy Commissioner would be reduced to a 
position of riding a swivel chair and giving nothing to the state 
because of lack of funds with which to operate. Husby threatened 
to close the office entirely and stated that what happened to the 
farmers was the Governor's responsibility "This veto eliminates all 
restriction on sanitation and is a blow to the health of the people."67
The Governor was also praised for reducing public expenditure 
in accordance with the diminished revenues of the state. It does not 
appear that the method used to reduce items was an issue in 1933» 
only that the state should operate within its means.
During the legislative session of 1937* Langer was accused of 
using his veto power to gain control of the commissioners office of 
the Veterans Service Commission. Lieutenant Governor Thoresen also 
attacked Langer for his vetoes of appropriations of two schools:
Surely if he was looking for something to veto, which he 
undoubtedly was, he could have found something else, something 
not so vital as our educational institutions. But something 
else would not have been dramatic enough for the chief executive 
of this state. That we have launched ourselves on a period of 
turmoil and upheavel appears certain.
This criticism came from a Republican executive official and was
°^Grand Forks Herald, March 3, 1927. p. 1.
67grand Forks Herald, March 27. 1933. pp. 1-2.
6^Grand Forks Herald, March 5. 1937. p. 10.
69Ibid.. March 9. 1937, p. 2
directed to another Republican executive officer. At this tine in 
North Dakota politics, the Republicans were split among themselves 
giving way to many fights between the Republicans rather than between 
the two political parties. This is one factor in explaining the 
number of vetoes registered by Governor Langer.
From the years 19^9 through 1959» there was little criticism 
of gubernatorial vetoes. During this period the executive and the 
legislative departments were controlled by the same political party, 
producing some degree of harmony. In two of the six legislative 
sessions, no vetoes were recorded and for the same time period, only 
one appropriation bill was cut, that being Senate Bill 1 of 1953*
Table 8 on the following page gives a nineteen year comparison 
on the extent of the gabernatorial veto in North Dakota and South 
Dakota. The chart indicates that the two states compared quite 
closely in use of the veto. The veto procedure is similar in the 
two states except for two provisions. The governor of South Dakota 
has ten days after adjournment to act on legislation and for the 
legislature to override a veto requires a two-thirds vote of the 
members present in each house. South Dakota has also adopted 
annual sessions of the legislature which has allowed the governor 
a greater opportunity to" veto legislation during the time period 




COMPARISON OF GOVERNORS USE OF VETO IN NORTH DAKOTA AND SOUTH DAKOTA
Legislative No. of Bills Vetoed









1964 6 • •
1965 5 7
1966 2 • •
1967 6 21
Total 70 71
Sources: South Dakota Staff Memorandum Disposition of Bills
and Resolutions and Gubernatorial Vetoes of Bills, 1966 and 1967
South Dakota Legislature , State Legislative Research Council (Pierre,
South Dakota).
North Dakota Session Laws of the Legislative Assembly, 1949-
1967.
Table 9 on the following pages indicates the action of the 












































VOLUME OF LEGISLATION AND VETOES, 1889-1967
TABLE 9











597 219 109 15 5
457 134 67 3 0
7 7 0 0 0
349 137 29 18 2
337 140 41 30 3
411 151 50 12 10
398 175 65 0 0
458 215 69 5 0
525 210 41 13 1
528 192 60 24 0
686 273 86 10a 2
734 230 27 20 2
8 a 302 136 20 0
892 279 71 43 1
831 264 145 2, 0
769 233 17 I8b 0
118 15 11 1 0
414 230 97 8 1
118 68 11 0 0
420 142 25 4 0
713 353 168 29 0
593 223 127 4 1
623 287 148 22 6
15 1 0 0 0
461 258 187 11 1
665 213 67 7 0
686 269 87 52 0
694 283 113 16 1
634 242 20 37 a
8 6 0 2 0
680 253 52 7 0
554 304 85 5 1
463 270 70 7 1
50 35 1 1 0
498 335 62 3 2
627 373 102 3 0
591 355 114 5 0
561 344 158 5 1
623 353 132 4 0
612 355 177 0 0
634 392 128 0 0




No. of Bills, 
Resolutions 
Introduced
No. of Bills 
Fassed or 
Became Law








1961 747 391 153 9 0
1963 7'+9 426 281 16 4
1965 813 458 278 7 1
1965 17 8 0 0 0
1967 849 501 203 21 10
Total 24.685 11.335 4,156 523 78
aVetced a $25 concurrent resolution.
^Vetoed concurrent resolution.
Sources: House and Senate Journal Indexs 1889-1967. 
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CHAPTER III
GUBERNATORIAL VETO AS EXERCISED 
BY 'WILLIAM L. GUY, 1961-1967
The use of the gubernatorial veto by Governor William L. Guy 
received a great deal of publicity during and after the Fortieth 
Session of the North Dakota Legislative Assembly. Statements to the 
effect that Guy had set a reed’d for issuing gubernatorial vetoes 
were made in the news media. A large amount of the news coverage 
was devoted to the seven vetoes that were overridden by the legislature. 
The Herald reported that nobody around the legislature could remember 
when three or more vetoes had been overridden. The newspaper also 
stated that Guy had passed Langer's total of forty-one vetoes.^" The 
publicity given to Governor Guy's use of the veto seems to indicate 
that he has established some type of record for the use of the veto 
power. Does Governor Guy hold the "record" for issuing gubernatorial 
vetoes in North Dakota? This question will be answered in this 
chapter. A study of Governor Guy's use of the veto power is also 
included in this chapter.
One record that Governor Guy can claim, without challenge, is 
in having served as Governor of North Dakota longer than any other 
person. When the Fortieth Legislative Assembly convened in January
-1-Grand Forks Herald, March 1, 1967, p. 1.
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1967. Guy was in his seventh year as Governor. The previous "record"
2of longevity in office for any one governor was six years.
Another "record" Governor Guy could claim, without challenge 
also, is in having dealt with more regular sessions of the legislature 
than any previous governor of North Dakota. During Guy's tenure, four 
regular sessions of the Legislative Assembly have been held; the 
previous high for any governor was three. During these four regular 
sessions, Governor Guy has had the adversity of being the chief 
executive of the state and dealing with a legislature controlled by 
the opposition political party. Only once has Governor Guy been 
favored with one house of the legislature being controlled by his 
political party. Table 10 shows the political party alignment during 
the four regular legislative sessions that have met during Governor 
Guy's time in office.
TABLE 10
POLITICAL PARTY ALIGNMENT IN THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY, 1961-1967
Senate House
Year Democrats Republicans Democrats Republicans
1961 21 28 41 72
1963 12 37 43 70
1965 20 29 65 44
1967 5 44 15 83
Source; Grand Forks Herald.
Faced with this political opposition during most of his 
tenure, one would expect a governor to exercise his veto power more
2Grand Forks Herald, January 1, 1967, p. 6.
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frequently than when the two branches are controlled by the same 
political party. The extent of Governor Guy’s use of the veto power 
is indicated in Table 11.
TA3LE 11

















1961 8 1 9 $125,000 0 0
1963 15 1 16 140,000 4 0
1965 5 2 7 • • 1 0
1967 21 0 21 • • 10 7
Totals ^9 4 53 $265,000 15 7
Source: North Dakota Session Laws, 1961-1967.
As Tables 10 and 11 indicate, in the two sessions of the 
legislature that Governor Guy exercised his veto power the greatest 
number of times, 1963 and 1967. the Republicans had nearly a two- 
thirds majority in each house. Even with this large political 
advantage, the Republicans didn't override any of Guy’s vetoes until 
the 1967 legislative session.
One factor for'the overrides in 1967 and not in 1963, was 
that the legislature sent bills to the Governor well in advance of 
adjournment. By this action, the legislature forced the Governor 
to act on the legislation presented to him. North Dakota law requires 
the Governor to sign or veto bills within three days if presented to 
him prior to the last three days of the legislative session. If 
Governor Guy had failed to act on the legislation presented to him
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early in the session, the bills would have become law automatically. 
Governor Guy objected to ten bills, of which seven were later passed 
by legislative override and the other three bills were lost in the 
Senate.^
In the year that Governor Guy exercised his veto power the 
least number of times, 1965, the Democrats controlled one house of 
the Legislative Assembly. This unique situation, in North Dakota 
political history, found the Governor vetoing five bills introduced 
in the Republican controlled Senate and only two bills introduced in 
the Democratic controlled House. Only one veto was issued before 
adjoumament, that being a Senate bill. The chance that this veto 
would be overridden, in lieu of the political division between the 
two houses, was unthinkable.
Statements that Governor Guy holds a "record" compared to 
other North Dakota governors over the use of the gubernatorial veto 
can be challenged. Most of these assertions are general and not 
specific. The type of veto issued by the governor as well as what 
is included in the totals assigned to the various governors are not 
clarified.
The statement that Governor Guy holds the record for vetoes 
issued in one legislative session can be challenged. Guy’s twenty- 
one full vetoes in 1967 do not surpass the twenty-nine full vetoes 
of L. B. Hanna in 1913 or William Langer's twenty-five in 1933* Even 
if one adds the item veto into the total number of vetoes, issued 
during one session, Guy would not have the record. Governor Langer's
3Senate Journal, 1967.
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fifty-two vetoes in 1933 and Governor Hanna's forty-three in 1913 
surpass Guy's total. Governor Guy's total, for a single session, 
would still be twenty-one.
As to the assertion that Governor Guy issued more vetoes than 
any other North Dakota governor, a clarification is necessary. If 
the claim is that Guy issued more vetoes than any other governor, it 
wouldn't be true. Governor Guy has issued a total of fifty-three full 
and item vetoes while in office. Congparing this with William Langer's 
use of the veto, one finds that Langer issued a total of ninety-one 
full and item vetoes while Governor of North Dakota - a record.
Governor Guy would be rightfully credited with the record if 
the acknowledgement was for issuing full vetoes during tenure in office. 
Forty-nine full vetoes have been issued by Governor Guy during his 
seven years in office. The nearest competitor, in this category, is 
Langer. During his three and one-half years in office, Governor 
Langer issued forty-two full vetoes.
Any statement that Governor Guy has issued more item vetoes 
than any other governor would be erroneous. Guy issued only two 
item vetoes in a single session while Governor Nestos issued eighteen 
item vetoes in 1923. If one considers Langer's pared or partial veto 
as an item veto, then Langer has the record for a single session, 
twenty-five vetoes in 1933* Governor Guy's total of four item vetoes 
during his tenure in office certainly would not be close to the 
record. Nestos and Langer would still retain this honor with the 
eighteen item vetoes of Nestos' and the forty-nine of Langer's 
version of the item veto.
A statement that Guy had more vetoes overridden than any other
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governor must also be clarified. If the statement is based on full 
vetoes overridden by the legislature then the seven full vetoes over­
ridden in 1967 would stand. But if this statement is based upon total 
number of vetoes overridden, then the record would fall to Governor 
Briggs whose ten item vetoes were overridden in 1897-
In a Herald interview, Governor Guy explained his interpretation 
of the veto procedure. Guy's veto procedure is similar to the pro­
cedure explained earlier. The Governor stated that when he vetoes 
a bill he is required to send it back to the chamber of origination 
listing his objections. Then the chamber is required to act on the 
original bill, not specifically on the Governor's objections. Guy 
commented that if it should happen that the legislators agree with 
his objections the only way to refine the bill was to introduce it 
anew through the delayed bills committee. Guy also pointed out that 
the Attorney-General has ruled that the governor's time limitations 
are calendar days, not legislative days. "They can even stop the 
clock if they want to, and it makes no difference on the Governor's
If,time limits, according to an attorney general's ruling," said Guy.
It was Governor Guy's opinion that this could lead to an 
awkward situation if a session should go overtime. The Governor 
has fifteen days to sign or veto a bill after the sixty calendar days 
of a regular legislative session. If the legislature stopped the 
clock and continued in session for five days, past the sixty calendar 
days, the Governor would only have ten days in which to act on 
legislation.^
^Grand Forks Herald, February 21, 1967, pp. 1, ? •
5lbid
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If this situation did occur, it would seem an infringement 
upon the Governor's veto power. The Governor is allowed fifteen days 
to study the legislation and act upon it. To deny him the full fifteen 
days to act, because the legislature extended the time limit, is unfair. 
Under the Attorney-General's opinion, it could be possible for a 
legislature to extend the session by "covering the clock," for sixteen 
days and deny the Governor any time to consider the bills sent to 
him when the legislature finally did adjourn.
This type of situation has not occurred in North Dakota, and 
probably never will. There seems to be an unwritten agreement between 
the executive and the legislature that the fifteen day period applies 
from the time the Legislative Assembly actually adjourns, and not 
calendar days. One possible avenue open to a governor, if such a 
situation faced the governor, was proposed by Lloyd Omdahl. A 
member of Governor Guy's administrative staff, Omdahl, when questioned 
on what would happen if bills didn't get to the Governor's desk within 
the fifteen day period said, "We'd stop the clock in the governor's 
office.
Whether this tactic would be successful or not, cannot be 
ascertained until it is tried. It seems only reasonable, that if the 
legislature can pass bills after the sixty calendar days allowed by 
the State Constitution, the Governor should be entitled to the full 
fifteen days after the legislature finally adjourns.
In the same Herald interview, Governor Guy gave his opinion 
on the item veto power of the chief executive. Guy pointed out that
6Ibid., March 9. 1967, p. 13.
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under current law, he can veto lined items in appropriation items.
He cannot reduce or increase but can only veto or pass on the items.
This opinion, of the Governor’s, seems to indicate that Guy 
believes that line items apply to more than just definite items of 
money in appropriation bills. His veto of items in Senate Appropriation 
Bills One and Two, in 1965. did not involve definite sums of money,
g
but rather a transfer of funds between line items.
The actual procedure of vetoing a bill was demonstrated by
Governor Guy for two Carrington girls in the Capitol lunchroom. The
Governor crossed out the section of the bill marked approved and
placed the time and date of 10:^5 a.m., February 25. on the space
marked disapproved; then he signed the measure. The bill vetoed
9would have permitted farming by corporations in North Dakota.
The procedure of handling bills presented to Governor Guy’s 
office was explained by a member of the Governor's staff. After the 
bills are received in the Governor's office, they are taken to a 
large room adjoining the main office. The bills are placed upon a 
large table and sorted according to the departments involved. The 
various department members read and study the bills pertaining to 
their individual department. The bills are checked closely for 
terminology, spelling,"punctuation and clarity of intent. If a bill 
is found to contain errors, it is returned to the enrolling and engrossing 
department for correction.
^Ibid., February 21, 1967. p. 7*
Q North Dakota, Session Laws, I965.
^Fargo Forum, February 26, 1967. A-6.
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Bills that are judged correct and are favored will, in all 
probability, be signed by the Governor. The bills the Governor signs 
while the legislature is in session are returned to the house of 
origination along with the Governor's message stating that he has 
signed the bills.
The bills that are objectionable to the Governor, and he 
vetoes, will have an attached statement stating the reason or reasons 
for the veto. All the veto messages of Governor Guy have been written 
by the Governor. When the Governor vetoes a bill, during a legislative 
session, he returns it to the house of origination with his veto 
message. If the veto is performed after the legislature has adjourned, 
the veto and the message are filed with the Secretary of State within 
the fifteen day limit. If the Governor fails to sign or veto the 
legislation, it becomes law.^®
Governors who exercise the veto power have found that problems 
exist in the veto process and Governor Guy is no exception. One 
problem that has appeared is in the receiving of bills in the 
Governor's office. What constitutes delivery of bills to the Governor 
is not clear. The State Constitution states that a bill to become 
a law must be presented to the Governor. One questions if this 
statement means that the bills must be delivered to the Governor 
personally, or would presenting the bills to his secretary in the 
Governor's office be the same thing? Normally there isn't any 
controversy over this matter, unless delivery occurs near the end 
of the legislative session.
-^This procedure was explained by a member of Governor Guy's 
staff during a personal interview at the Capitol, July 18, 1967.
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As it has been stated earlier in this study the Governor 
has three days to sign or disapprove a bill before adjournment. But 
the final three days of a legislative session are considered a part 
of the fifteen day period the Governor has after adjournment. There­
fore, bills received by the Governor during the 58th, 59th and 60th 
day, if vetoed, are not required to be returned to the legislature 
with the Governor's objections.
During the 1961 Legislative Assembly a situation occurred 
that clearly shows the problem. Senator Elton V/. Ringsak, Republican 
from Grafton, complained that Governor Guy's office would not accept 
eleven bills dispatched by a Senate messenger. The bills were taken 
to the Governor's office where the Governor's receptionist asked the 
messenger if the Senate had adjourned. The messenger replied "no."
The receptionist said that she could not accept the bills for the 
Governor. Senator Ringsak's point, on this matter, was that if the 
Senate had adjourned it would have been in the 58th day of the session, 
and if the Senate had not adjourned it would still be the 57th day. 
According to Ringsak, bills received before the 58th day of the 60 
day session are to be acted upon by the executive before the session 
ends, but those received by the Governor in the last three legislative 
days may be acted upon within the fifteen day period. Normally a 
legislative day ends at 2:00 p.m., but in this situation the legislature 
had not ended its 57th day until lO:^ p.m., Wednesday. Thus, Ringsak 
said:
Had the Governor taken the bills before the Senate had 
ended its 57th day, he would have been obligated to act on 
them before the session's end; but by refusing them then and 
not taking them until the 58th day, he will have 15 days in 
which to act. And by that time the legislature will be long 
gone.
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Ringsak said he considered the action "a kid trick" on the part of 
the Governor.
This criticism was answered by the Governor's office. It was 
explained that the procedure of not accepting any more bills than 
could be checked and made ready for signing in the final three day 
period was not new but was similar to the procedure of prior adminis­
trations. Lloyd Omdahl said the Governor didn't know of the incident 
but tnat receptionist Mrs. Becky Zoller, by not accepting more bills 
than could be processed in the three day period, was following normal 
procedure.
This explanation didn't satisfy Senator Ringsak. The Senator 
continued his attack by stating:
Since when, can or does a receptionist dictate the terms 
of the governor's office as to receiving or not receiving 
important bills of legislation which affect all of the people 
of North Dakota7̂ -3
This controversy was not settled nor the answer presented as to what 
constitutes receiving bills by the Governor during the 1961 legislative 
session.
During the 1967 legislative session, one of Governor Guy's 
staff received a telephone call from a member of the legislature. As 
it was late in the evening, the Governor's office was closed. The 
staff member was directed to come to the Capitol building and open 
the Governor's office to receive bills. The staff member did as he *12
^ •Grand Forks Herald. March 2, 196l, p. 10.
12Ibid.
-̂3ibid., March 3* 1961, p. 3*
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was directed and the bills were received in the Governor's office.^ 
Whether this manner of requiring acceptance of bills is proper or not 
is also unanswerable at this time.
There are other problems in the veto process, but one problem 
Governor Guy hasn't faced is bills lest, stolen or strayed. In 
1889, an Australian ballot bill was stolen and the Governor couldn't 
sign it. In 1893* eight Senate and five House bills, that had passed 
both houses, failed to reach the Governor for his action. Somewhere 
between the legislative halls and the Governor's office these bills 
disappeared. In 1891 a bill was stolen and an asking price of $2,000 
was demanded for the bill's return.^ One doubts that any of these 
situations would appear today.
Under the present executive alignment in North Dakota where 
the Governor and the Lieutenant Governor are both elective offices, 
a possible problem could occur over the veto usage. Democratic 
Governor Guy has had a Republican Lieutenant Governor for two of his 
three terms and this study indicated that all was not harmony between 
the two offices. With this type of relationship, what would the 
Lieutenant Governor do with the veto power if the Governor was absent 
from the state or was unable to perform his duties. It would seem 
that the Lieutenant Governor acting as the Governor would have the 
veto power. As yet this situation has not occurred in North Dakota 
history. Normally during the sessions of the Legislative Assembly,
■^This incident was related during a personal interview by 
this writer with two administrative assistants of Governor Guy on 
July 18, 1967, at the State Capitol building.
argo Forum, March 6, 1893. P* !•
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the Governor is not absent from the state. But there are examples of 
where the Lieutenant Governor has signed bills in the absence of the 
Governor.
Governor Guy in attending the inauguration of Fresident 
Kennedy in 1961 presented the Lieutenant Governor the opportunity to 
veto legislation. The Lieutenant Governor didn't take advantage of 
the opportunity but rather he criticized Guy for leaving the state 
for political publicity.^ The way the political line up has been 
in North Dakota, predominately Republican in the legislature and the 
executive branches, one doubts that a Lieutenant Governor will ever 
exercise the veto power, but the possibility still exists that it 
could happen, and it would add another page to the colorful pages 
of North Dakota political history. To prevent this possibility it 
may be an advantage to have the Governor and Lieutenant Governor 
elected as a team, rather than individually, insuring that the 
Governor and Lieutenant Governor are of the same political party.
Governors of North Dakota have received praise as well as 
criticism over their use of the gubernatorial veto and Governor Guy 
is no exception. Guy has probably received more publicity over his 
use of the veto than the previous governors primarily because he 
has been Governor longer than any other person. The increase in the 
various types of news media and the improvement of these means of 
communication have also contributed to the publicity that Guy has 
received.
Governor Guy, a Democratic Governor seemingly surrounded by
•^Grand Forks Herald, January 28, 1961, p. 8.
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Republicans, appears to receive more criticism than praise over the 
use of the veto. Not only have a number of Republicans criticized 
Guy but some Democrats have disapproved of his use of the veto too. 
There is also evidence that both political organizations have, at 
times, supported the Governor’s actions. A gubernatorial veto ■will 
affect different groups and interests in various ways as Governor Guy 
found out.
A great number of the Republican charges are that Guy vetoes 
for political reasons. Senator Evan Lips, Senator Majority Leader in 
1967, states this fact:
The historic number of vetoes which the 'Governor has 
imposed on good legislation that would have been beneficial 
to our State, proves, beyond a doubt, that he has only his 
political future in mind and not the State of North Dakota. '
Bruce Streibel, House Floor Leader, remarked after a Guy
statement:
It was the first time that I had seen a public official 
attempt to label conservatives as spenders.
Guy, according to Streibel, was placing priority on politics rather
18than on concern for people.
Robert KcCarney was another Republican who thought Guy wasn't 
doing all the vetoing for the people of North Dakota. McCarney 
referred to Guy as "the fastest pen in the W e s t . I f  the Governor 
was considered fast by McCarney, then the legislature was equally as *18
^Ibid., March 12, 1967. p. 24.
18Ibid., March 10, 1967, p. 16.
•^Ibid., March 18, 1967. p. 4.
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fast. It took the House five minutes to override Guy’s veto of the 
partial personal property tax after getting his veto message.*®
Larry Erickson, Democratic party chairman, observed that 
another veto was overridden within minutes after being received. In 
a statement on the speed in overriding Governor Guy's veto of the 
corporate farm bill, Erickson said*
The House overriding Governor William Guy's veto of the 
corporation farm bill a few minutes after receiving it was 
+o deny the voters of this state an opportunity to contact 
their representatives.
The majority opinion of our citizens is against the 
corporation farm bill. The bill is an open gate for every 
stray million dollars to come into this state to outbid the 
family farmer for any available acreage.21
The Herald commented on Guy's veto of the partial personal
property tax, that the veto seemed politically motivated. The paper
22accused the Governor of trying to make votes from vetoes.
When some of Governor Guy's vetoes came under attack other 
people defended his action. Guy's veto of the bank interest rate was 
considered politically motivated by the executive secretary of the 
North Dakota Banker's Association. William Daner said of the veto,
"It was another in a series of the Governor's politically motivated 
vetoes."*^ state Democratic party chairman, Larry Erickson, took 
exception to Daner's criticism of Guy, by relating that the 
Republicans had campaigned deploring high interest rates, but couldn't 
wait to raise them even higher when given the opportunity. Erickson 
reminded Daner of the North Dakota Banker's Association Convention 2
2-*-Ibid., February 28, 1967, p. 10.
22ibid., March *+, 1967, p.
23ibid., March 16, 1967, p. 11.
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held at Williston two years earlier. At this convention banners and 
posters promoting Republican legislators and congressional candidates 
flooded the hall. The convention was even halted long enough for 
the Republican party to take up a collection right on the floor, 
according to Erickson. Daner w'as asked by Erickson how he could 
consider the Republican legislature's raising interest rates as not 
being political, yet consider it political when the Governor vetoed 
such rates.
Governor Guy also had some personal views over political 
motivations on this same bill. Guy in a speech to the Democratic 
Legislative Advisory Committee, stated that there was a possibility 
that the Republican controlled legislature of 1967 did not want to 
override his veto of the bank interest rate bill. The Governor had 
informed the committee handling this legislation that he would veto 
the bill increasing minimum rate interests from seven to eight per 
cent. This bill would have applied to banks and lending institutions. 
According to Guy the bankers were among the main supporters of the 
Republicans in the last campaign. Even with the advanced warning 
of the veto, the bill didn't reach the Governor until the legislature 
had gone home, thereby preventing a chance to override the veto.
Guy said:
Republican majorities had complete control over legis­
lation and timing, but these increased interest bills came to 
me after the legislature had left. This indicates to me that 
the Republican party is grateful to the banking fraternity, 
but decided to pay them off in confederate currency.
^ Tbid., March 16, 1967, p. 11.
2̂ Grand Forks Herald, March 22, 1963, p. 1.
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Governor Guy was also accused of playing politics in 1963 
over the use of the item veto. The Governor had itemed out $140,000 
from appropriation bills that provided funds for the operation of 
various state departments. Guy received criticism from the Republicans 
but this was to be expected as the cuts were in departments headed by 
Republicans.
C. P. Dahl, who was the Republican appointed Director of the
State Laboratory Department, had his salary appropriation itemed out.
Dahl complained that the Democratic Governor's action was 'purely
political.'2^ Guy indicated that Dahl's salary could be paid from
the money authorized for clerk hire to be spent for inspection, some
27of which was being used for political purpose. The Governor didn't 
go into detail on this political charge.
State Insurance Commissioner Frank Albers had his travel 
expenses itemed out of the appropriation bill involving his department. 
Albers said that Guy's vetoes were in departments headed by Republicans 
and he added:
. . .he’s (Guy) still sore because he couldn't get the 
best of Jensen and he's taking it out on me.* 278
A.J. Jensen was the former Republican Insurance Commissioner who,
29before he retired in 15.62, had battled Guy many times.
On the same veto Guy drew criticism from Representative James 
W. Johnson, also a Republican. Johnson said that if Guy wanted to





save money, the Governor could have reduced his own appropriation. 
Guy was accused of ’spite politics' by Johnson for making the cuts. 
The Herald records Johnson’s statement:
By these vetoes our Governor has certainly signified 
that to him spite politics is more important than efficient 
administration of our state departments. . .In the interests 
of sound state government, the Governor could far better 
have reduced his own appropriations if saving money was 
his only motive in the vetoes which he made.-'®
No one person is apparently safe from political attack over a 
gubernatorial veto. Only the Governor can sign a veto message, but 
there are times when people close to him also receive criticism. 
Commissioner of Labor Orville Hagen commented after a Guy veto:
It appears that politics was the main reason for vetoing 
House Bill 655* Governor Guy, his Administrative Director,
Lloyd Omdahl, and Dockter apparently did not want the Repub­
lican controlled legislature to have credit for enacting this 
legislation.-'1
Wallace Dockter, President of the North Dakota AFL-CIO Labor
Union, could not be blamed if he had mixed emotions for being included
in Hagen's charge. Earlier in March of the same year, Dockter had
32complained about a Guy veto of the personal property tax bill.
Governor Guy was criticized for failing to sign four revenue 
bills in 1963, and allowing the bills to become law without his
signature. Fay Brown attacked Guy by saying:
I am sure by now the citizens of North Dakota are well 
aware of the phony double talk by the man occupying the 
Governor's office, who puts the interest of special groups 
ahead of that of the welfare and good of all the people of 
North Dakota.33
3°Ibid., p. 7.
31Grand Forks Herald, March 17, 1967, p. 9* 
32Ibid., March 5» 19^7 * p. 26.
33grand Forks Herald, March 26, 1963, p. 1.
On the day before Brown's criticism, Governor Guy, after allowing the 
four revenue bills to become law, belittled the Republican controlled 
legislature. The Governor stated that he would have vetoed these bills 
and called a special session if he thought the majority party could 
improve their tax program.. Guy remarked:
But how could a Republican majority be expected to 
improve on something that took a record ?0 days to do in 
the first place.
If the people of North Dakota thought that Governor Guy had 
put the interests of special groups ahead of them, as Brown said, it 
was not indicated by the election of 1964. Governor Guy was elected 
to a third term of office by the people of North Dakota, and also 
became the first Governor elected to a four year terra of office.
Governors have changed their viewpoint on legislation and 
Governor Guy is no exception. In 1961, Guy signed a bill prohibiting 
any North Dakota city from going on daylight saving tine. In 1967 the 
Governor vetoed a bill that would exempt North Dakota from daylight 
saving time. The Governor listed eleven reasons for his veto of this 
bill, and said that he had done more research on this bill than on 
any other to cross his desk. Guy stated that his reason for changing 
his view was not because he opposed standard time, but that he desired 
North Dakota to be on the sane time as the rest of the nation. The 
Governor was concerned about the heavily populated North Dakota 
counties bordering next to Minnesota. Guy said that these counties, 
"would be heavily disadvantaged if we did not observe uniform time."35
3^lbid., March 25, 1963, p. 1.




In 1965 Governor Guy changed his view over legislation 
previously vetoed when he signed a bill that permitted an increase 
in trunk lengths from sixty feet to sixty-five feet. In 1963 Guy
o £
had vetoed a similar bill..
Governor Guy also changed his view over corporate farming.
During the 1963 legislative session, Guy favored a limited corporate 
farming bill that would have changed the 1932 law forbidding any 
corporate agriculture operation in the state. There was enough 
opposition from the Governor's political party to prevent the bill 
from becoming a law. A similar situation occurred in the 1961
37legislative session. During the 1967 legislative session Guy vetoed 
a corporate farming bill even though he indicated the bill could hold 
advantages for him in his farming operation.^
In exercising the gubernatorial veto during the 1967 legislative 
session, Governor Guy must have had many mixed emotions. One writer 
suggested how Guy must have felt during the hectic 1967 session.
L. J. Dewing reported in the Turtle Mountain Star:
I am quite sure that Governor Guy feels like he has been 
virtually left to fight the battle of state affairs alone, as 
he surveys the multitude of Republicans hurtling in and out of 
the legislative chamber doors, hallways and coat rooms. He 
could not be faulted if he is getting a feeling that there 
are more Republicans than people in Bismarck. He sees all 
his poor little vetoes go for naught as the legislature 
gobbles each one he hurls at it and gleefully overrides it.
I'll bet he is even beginning to wonder if anyone will 
listen to him when he shouts 'no' at home anymore.39
3^Grand Forks Herald, March 17. 1965, p. 1.
37grand Forks Herald, January 27, I963, p. 1.
3^Grand Forks Herald. March 2^, 1967, p. 9-
^ Turtle Mountain Star as cited in the Grand Forks Herald, 
March 12, 1967, p. 6.
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The legislature didn't 'gobble' each veto, nor did it 'override each 
veto' as Mr. Dewing implies. Three vetoes were sustained by the 
Senate.
Governor Guy did receive support over some of his vetoes in 
1967. The Mandan Morning Tribune supported two non-political vetoes. 
The veto of a bill allowing unlimited speed on the interstate highways 
and the daylight time action of the Governor were favored by the 
newspaper. It reasoned that the action put the state more in line 
with what other states were doing. The Herald didn't believe the 
Governor acted wisely or in the best interests of the state in all 
of his vetoes, but it did approve setting aside the measure that would 
have eliminated traffic speed limits on certain interstate highways.^
The use of the gubernatorial veto by Governor Guy will no 
doubt have an effect on his political future, possibly the measures 
selected by Guy to veto will be the issues in the I968 election 
campaign. According to the Mandan Morning Tribune;
"Whether it is Guy or someone else carrying the Democratic 
banner, that candidate will run against a 1967 Republican 
legislative record. One can expect to hear in the months 
before the election about corporate fanning, pollution, 
increased sales tax, tax loopholes and reform, increased 
interest rates, taxing cooperatives, and many other 
subjects. :̂
The Herald predicted that Guy will be defeated if he runs for a 
fourth term. In the editorial, the writer believed that Guy had
uoManaan Morning Tribune as cited in the Grand Forks Herald, 
March 19, 1967. p. 19.
^^Grand Forks Herald, March 21, 1967, p. 4-.
hpMandan Morning Tribune as cited in the Grand Forks Herald. 
March 6, 1967. p. 9»
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certainly done enough for the state, or done the state enough,
L')depending on the individual viewpoint. J
If Governor Guy decides to run for a fourth term, it will 
be interesting to see if the Herald's prediction is correct or not.
It will also be interesting to see what viewpoint the individual voter 
takes on the performance of Governor Guy.
In the study of Guy's use of the veto, one finds many areas 
of legislation vetoed. The Governor's messages are clear as to his 
reason or reasons for issuing the veto. Governor Guy stated that his 
reasons were in the public interest or not good policy. The use of 
the gubernatorial veto by Governor Guy cannot be considered excessive, 
when compared to the history of the veto usage in North Dakota. 
Considering that political party differences existed between the 
executive and legislative branches during Guy's tenure of office and 
that the voters elected Guy to the office of Governor three times, 
one might expect the Governor to act in the manner he considers to 
be in the best interests of the people who placed him into office.
43Grand Forks Herald, March 12, 1967, p. 4
CHAPTER IV
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Summary
The Northwest Ordinance established an absolute gubernatorial 
veto for the early Dakota Territorial governors over acts of the 
territorial legislature. Congress, later, changed the organic law 
to allow the territorial legislature to override the executive veto 
by a two-thirds vote of each house. The governor retained an absolute 
veto over legislation after the adjournment of the legislature. The 
item veto was not included in the veto powers of the Dakota Territorial 
governors. The power to veto legislation of all types was retained 
by the territorial governors of Dakota until statehood was achieved 
for North and South Dakota.
Governors of North Dakota have had the veto power since the 
beginning of statehood. There has been one constitutional amendment 
relating to the gubernatorial veto power since the adoption of the 
North Dakota State Constitution. The governor has three days in which 
to veto or sign a bill during the legislative session and fifteen days 
in which to sign or disapprove after adjournment of the Legislative 
Assembly. The legislature may override a veto by a two-thirds vote 
of the members elected. The item veto has been available to governors 
since statehood. In 1919 the governor was given authority to veto 
acts of the State Industrial Commission. This is not a legislative 
veto, but is still a type of veto power.
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The power to veto initiated or referred measures is denied to 
North Dakota governors by the State Constitution. Only one Supreme 
Court decision has been rendered on the constitutional veto power of 
the governor. The ruling stated that Sundays were to be counted as 
a part of the fifteen day time period after adjournment.
Conclusions
The evidence gained from this study indicates that almost all 
the Dakota Territorial governors used the veto power over territorial 
legislation. There is no definite pattern on the use of the veto 
by the territorial governors. Many different types of legislation 
were vetoed by the different governors. The evidence also indicates 
that when the Dakota Territorial Legislature gained the authority to 
override a gubernatorial veto, the Assembly didn't hesitate to 
exercise this power. A part of the problem, that caused vetoes to be 
overridden, was due to the fact that executives were appointed by 
the President of the United States and the legislature was elected 
by the people of the territory. Also, the political party differences 
and the independent thinking of the people of the territory had a 
part in the veto problems of the territorial legislature. Evidence 
was also found that at.least one Dakota governor desired the item 
veto power, but he was not granted this authority by the Congress.
It can be stated that politics was very evident when the Dakota 
Territorial governors used the veto power.
The use of the veto by the governors of the State of North 
Dakota exhibits no definite pattern. All but one governor has 
exercised the gubernatorial veto when given the opportunity to do so. 
It has been exercised by both Democrat and Republican governors. A
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greater number of vetoes were cast by Republican than by Democratic 
governors. However, there have been more Republican than Democratic 
governors in the state.
When there have been political party differences between the 
executive branch and the legislative branches, the veto power was 
exercised more freely than when the two branches were controlled by 
the same party. Even when the governor and the legislature are of 
the same political party there seems to be no guarantee that the veto 
will not be exercised. Differences within the Republican party led 
to Governor Langer's extensive use of the gubernatorial veto.
This study also indicates that in periods of economic distress, 
the veto will be used more often than during periods of prosperity.
During times of national emergencies, such as war, the veto has not 
been used to any extent by North Dakota governors.
More gubernatorial vetoes are exercised in North Dakota after 
the adjournment of the Legislative Assembly than during the session.
The Legislative Assembly is to a large extent responsible for many of 
these vetoes because of the large amount of legislation passed just 
prior to adjournment.
The veto power has not been abused by North Dakota governors 
when compared to a number of other states. The North Dakota governors 
seemingly have not used their veto power in haste or without considerable 
thought. When one reads the veto messages of the various governors, 
this point seems quite clear. Charges that a great many gubernatorial 
vetoes in North Dakota are politically motivated cannot be answered 
by this study. There are indications that some of the 523 vetoes 
were political, but only the men who issued the vetoes could answer
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these charges. There are no indications in the veto messages that 
the governor’s reasons were political.
This study also gives no evidence that the item veto has been 
abused by any one governor. The amounts of money deleted or reduced 
from appropriation bills have been primarily in the interests of 
economy and keeping expenditures within estimated income. Just what 
the governors item veto power actually involves will never be 
absolutely clear until the North Dakota Supreme Court clarifies it 
by a court ruling.
It would seem that future North Dakota governors will use 
their veto power when the governor deems it justifiable and in the 
public interest. The political history of North Dakota indicates 
that the governor and the legislature will not always be in agreement. 
It is safe to assume that governors will veto legislation in the 
future and the Legislative Assembly will occasionally override a 
governor’s veto.
Re c ommendati ons
The trend in state constitutional revisions is clearly 
in the direction of giving the executive more time for delibera­
tion on legislation.^" The three day time limit for gubernatorial 
consideration during the legislative session should be increased 
to five days. The large number of bills that are submitted to the 
governor for his study would indicate the need for increasing this
■'■Joseph E. Kallenback, The American Chief Executive, the 
Presidency and the Governorship (New York: Harper and Row, 1966)'.
p. 362.
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provision. Only nine states limit the governor to three days for
2action on legislation.
This writer would be in agreement with Lieutenant Governor 
Charles Tighe for increasing the legislative session to longer than 
sixty days. Tighe said, "I am convinced that the amount of legislation 
now being introduced cannot be given fair and adequate consideration in 
the 60-day sessions every two years."3
The sixty-day constitutional limitation upon the Legislative 
Assembly creates many problems. Because of the short period allowed 
for making laws, a great deal of legislation is passed in the final 
days of the session. The large number of bills reaching the governor's 
office in these final days presents problems for both the governor 
and the legislature. By establishing annual sessions of the 
legislature, meeting for a period of 120 days each year, may alleviate 
some of the problems relating to the veto. With the longer time 
period, legislation could be sent to the governor at an earlier time 
and would allow the legislature additional time to consider a guberna­
torial veto. The annual sessions seemingly would make the legislature 
more responsive to the needs of the state and perhaps would allow 
closer supervision over the joint actions of the executive and 
legislative departments.
It is also recommended that the governor be given the power 
to reduce items in appropriation bills. This proposal was included 
in a constitutional revision amendment in 1966 and failed. Perhaps
pBook of the States, p. 58. Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, 
New Mexico, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota and Vfyeming.
3c-rand Forks Herald, July 25, 1967, p. 2.
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a single amendment should be offered to the people allowing the 
reduction of items by the governor; perhaps a constitutional convention 
should be held to modernize the entire Constitution, and this proposal 
should be a part of the revision made.
Placing all constitutional changes in one amendment offers too 
many proposals that might offend too many people, although perhaps 
for varying reasons. Such persons would vote against the amendment, 
causing the whole amendment to fail.
Allowing the governor to reduce items in appropriations would 
permit him to keep them close to his budget proposal. The governor 
would not be placed in the situation of having to accept or reject 
each appropriation item.
It is also recommended that the Governor and Lieutenant 
Governor be elected as a team, that is to say, of the same political 
party. This suggestion doesn’t directly apply to the veto povrer, but 
it would prevent a possible situation as outlined earlier in this
paper
APPENDIX A
NORTH DAKOTA CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
FOR THE GUBERNATORIAL VETO
ARTICLE III SECTION 79
Every bill which shall have passed the Legislative Assembly 
shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the Governor. If he 
approve, he shall sign, but if not, he shall return it with his 
objections, to the house in which it originated, which shall enter 
the objections at large upon the journal, and proceed to reconsider 
it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of the members-elect 
shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the 
objections, to the other house, by which it shall likewise be recon­
sidered, and if it be approved by two-thirds of the members-elect, 
it shall become a law; but in all such cases the vote of both houses 
shall be determined by the yeas and nays, and the names of the 
members voting for and against the bill shall be entered upon the 
journal of each house respectively. If any bill shall not be returned 
by the Governor within three days (Sunday excepted) after it shall 
have been presented to him, the same shall be a law, unless the. 
Legislative Assembly, by its adjournment, prevent its return, in which 
case it shall be a law unless he shall file the same with his 
objections, in the office of the Secretary of State, within fifteen 
days after such adjournment.
8^
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ARTICLE III SECTION 80
The Governor shall have power to disapprove of any item or 
items, or part or parts of any bill making appropriations of money 
or property embracing distinct items, and the part or parts of the 
bill approved shall be the law, and the item or items, and part or 
parts disapproved shall be void, unless enacted in the following 
manner: If the Legislative Assembly be in session he shall transmit 
to the house in which the bill originated a copy of the item or 
items, or part or parts thereof disapproved, together with his 
objections thereto, and the items or parts objected to shall be 
separately reconsidered, and each item or part shall then take the 
same course as is prescribed for the passage of bills over the 
executive veto.
ARTICLE III SECTION 81
Any Governor of this State who asks, receives or agrees to 
receive any bribe upon any understanding that his official opinion, 
judgment or action shall be influenced thereby, or who gives or 
offers, or promises his official influence in consideration that 
any member of the Legislative Assembly shall give his official vote 
or influence on any particular side of any question or matter upon 
which he may be required to act in his official capacity, or who 
menaces any member by the threatened use of his veto power, or who 
offers or promises any member that he, the said Governor, shall 
appoint any particular person or persons to any office created or 
thereafter to be created, in consideration that any member shall 
give his official vote or influence on any matter pending or hereafter
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to be introduced into either house of said Legislative Assembly, or 
who threatens any member that he, the said Governor, will remove any 
person or persons from office or position with intent in any manner 
to influence the action of said member shall be punished in the manner 
now, or that may hereafter, be provided by law, and upon conviction 
thereof shall forfeit all right to hold or exercise any office of 
trust or honor in this State.
ARTICLE II SECTION 25 AS AMENDED BY ARTICLE 15 AND ARTICLE 26 OF 
AMENDMENTS
The veto power of the Governor shall not extend to the 
measures initiated by or referred to the Electors. No measures 
enacted or approved by a vote of the Electors shall be repealed or 
amended by the Legislature, except upon a yea and nay vote upon roll 
call of two-thirds of all the members elected to each house.
APPENDIX B
PUNISHMENT FOR VETO THREAT
North Dakota Century Code 12-08-18. Governor receiving bribes.~
Any person holding the office of governor of this state who:
1. Asks, receives, or agrees to receive any bribe upon any 
understanding that his official opinion, judgment, or 
action shall be influenced thereby;
2. Gives, offers, or promises his official influence in 
consideration or upon condition that any member of the 
legislative assembly, or either house thereof, shall give 
his official vote or influence on any particular side of 
any question or matter upon which he may be required to 
act in his official capacity;
3. Menaces any member of the legislative assembly, or either 
house thereof, by the threatened use of his veto power;
4. Offers or promises any member of the legislative assembly, 
or either house thereof, that he, the said governor, will 
nominate for appointment or appoint any particular person
or persons to any office created or thereafter to be created, 
in consideration or upon condition that any such member 
shall give his official vote or influence on any matter 
pending or thereafter to be introduced into either house 
of the legislative assembly; or
5. Threatens any member of the legislative assembly, or 
either house thereof, that he, the said governor, will 
remove any person or persons from any office or position 
held by such person or persons under the laws of this 
state, with intent in any manner to influence the action 
of said member',
shall be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not less 
than one year nor more than ten years, or in the county jail for 
not more than one year, or by a fine of not more than five thousand 
dollars, or by both such fine and imprisonment, and upon conviction 
of any of the offenses mentioned in this section, shall forfeit any 
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